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I. Abstract
This article' will present a concise legal history tracing the
development of United States national policy and law relating to
the generation, transportation, storage and disposal of the high-
level nuclear waste commonly known as "spent nuclear fuel" since
the authorization of commercial nuclear power by the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954. It will identify and discuss the principal out-
standing issues of law and policy associated with spent nuclear
fuel as the nation undertakes the disaggregation and deregulation
of the electric utility industry. The article will describe the princi-
1. This article is based on the thesis which the author submitted in partial satis-
faction of the requirements for his LL.M. degree from Northwestern School of Law at
Lewis and Clark College. It could not have been completed without the steadfast sup-
port and timely help of Janice Weis, Director of the Environmental and Natural Re-
sources Law Program at Lewis & Clark. While retaining complete responsibility for
any errors or omissions, the author is also grateful for the thoughtful and instructive
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article by Bill Funk, Craig John-
ston and Jack Bogdanski of the Northwestern School of Law. He also wishes to ex-
press his appreciation for numerous corrections and changes, especially on technical
matters, suggested by David Lochbaum, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer for the
Union of Concerned Scientists.
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pal elements of the nation's transition from an electric utility in-
dustry of vertically integrated, regulated monopolies to an
industry in which generation is disaggregated from transmission
and distribution and its price is determined by market forces
rather than regulatory processes. The article will then evaluate
the implications of this transition for the future development of
law and policy relating to commercial spent fuel. As its thesis,
the article will demonstrate that the emergence of a competitive,
deregulated market for electric generation in conjunction with
projected increases in the cost of transportation, storage and dis-
posal of spent fuel will precipitate a financing crisis for high-level
nuclear waste law and policy as currently conceived. The article
will then conclude with policy proposals to resolve this crisis.
II. Nuclear Waste: A Brief Overview
Essentially all radioactive wastes start with one substance:
uranium ore. Virtually all man-made radioactive wastes come
from two sources: the production of nuclear weapons and the gen-
eration of electricity by nuclear power plants. 2 In one year, a typi-
cal nuclear power plant will generate seven billion kilowatt hours
of electricity.3 To produce that amount of electricity, the plant will
fission only approximately one ton of uranium and convert less
than two pounds of matter to energy.4 However, approximately
125,000 tons of uranium ore must be mined to supply the 175 tons
of uranium, which will be required to fuel the plant 5 (the accumu-
lated mill tailings produced by the refining of uranium ore total
more than 230 million tons).6 Moreover, the plant will generate
per year as much as forty-five tons of high-level radioactive waste
in the form of spent nuclear fuel and approximately 500 tons of
low-level radioactive waste of several different types. 7 Addition-
ally, by the end of its useful life, typically anticipated to be forty
years but often significantly shorter in actuality, the plant itself
will have become radioactive and have to be decommissioned. This
will generate wastes containing approximately one hundred times
2. All other sources, such as medical laboratories and industrial facilities, ac-
count for only a negligible fraction of radioactive waste. See Michael B. Gerrard, Fear
and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Compre-
hensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1047, 1074 (1994).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1087.
7. See Gerrard, supra note 2, at 1074.
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the radioactivity of all the other low-level radioactive waste pro-
duced during the plant's operating life.8
A. High-Level Commercial Waste Distinguished from Defense
Waste
A distinction is made in the United States between high-level
waste (HLW) classified as "commercial" and that classified as "de-
fense," according to whether the material is generated in commer-
cial electricity production or in nuclear weapons production and
naval propulsion reactors.9 The principal commercial HLW is
spent nuclear fuel from the reactors of nuclear power plants.10
The primary defense HLW is the residue, mainly liquid, from the
manufacture of plutonium for nuclear bombs and warheads.1
B. High-Level Waste Distinguished from Other Commercial
Nuclear Waste
In the United States, commercial HLW means (1) spent nu-
clear fuel, (2) liquid wastes resulting from the reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel, and (3) solid wastes into which liquid reproces-
sing wastes have been converted. 12 Transuranic waste (TRU)
means radioactive waste which contains material, such as pluto-
nium, having an atomic number greater than that of uranium. 13
Uranium mill tailings are the residue remaining after the extrac-
tion of fissionable uranium from mined uranium ore. 14 Low-level
wastes (LLW) are defined to mean all radioactive wastes that are
not high-level wastes, transuranic wastes, or uranium mill
tailings. 15
C. Spent Nuclear Fuel Distinguished from Other High-Level
Waste
When uranium fuel assemblies (containing 50 to 300 separate
rods) are initially loaded into the reactor of a commercial nuclear
8. See id. at 2086-87.
9. See John P. Holdren, Radioactive-Waste Mgmt. in the United States: Evolving
Policy Prospects and Dilemmas, 17 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 235, 240 (1992).
10. See Gerrard, supra note 2, at 1075.
11. See id.
12. See 10 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1997).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
14. See Gerrard, supra note 2, at 1087; see also Holdren, supra note 9, at 241.
15. See Gerrard, supra note 2, at 1087; see also Holdren, supra note 9, at 240.
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power plant, they are only mildly radioactive. 16 But, the fuel as-
semblies are gradually irradiated during the fission process 17 by
which nuclear power is produced. After several years, the fuel
rods become too spent and embrittled to support the fission pro-
cess efficiently.' The irradiated rods are then removed and re-
placed, becoming "spent nuclear fuel." The typical commercial
reactor discharges about thirty metric tons of spent nuclear fuel
per year. 19 In a few countries other than the United States,20 this
spent nuclear fuel is "reprocessed" to separate the remaining ura-
nium and produced plutonium from the other fission products for
subsequent reuse as nuclear fuel.2' The other fission products re-
maining following reprocessing are not subject to reuse and are
therefore wastes. They are primarily liquid, highly radioactive,
and very unstable, being quite prone to fire and explosion. To im-
prove their stability and safety, these high-level wastes are some-
times changed into solid forms.22 However, no commercially
16. "Radioactivity" is the distinguishing characteristic of the atoms of certain ele-
ments, known as radionuclides, which undergo spontaneous decay over time, emitting
energy in several forms (known as alpha, beta and gamma) which is sufficient to "ion-
ize," i.e. dislodge, electrons from other atoms. The rate of radioactive decay is mea-
sured in half-lives, the time it takes for half of the radioactive atoms in a particular
radionuclide to decay into another form. See THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS EDUC.
FUND, THE NUCLEAR WASTE PRIMER: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZENS 13 (1993) [hereinafter
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS].
17. "Fission" is the process by which the nucleus of an atom of a radionuclide is
split into two smaller nuclei either spontaneously or by the addition of neutrons. This
splitting releases neutrons, gamma radiation, and heat. The released neutrons strike
other nearby atoms, causing them to split also. If enough fissionable material is pre-
sent and contained, an ongoing chain reaction can begin. This chain reaction, if
caused quickly in a large quantity of fissionable material, can be explosive, as in the
case of nuclear weapons. By contrast, the nuclear chain reaction in a power plant is
controlled, with a smaller, slower and steadier release of energy, primarily in the form
of heat. This heat is then used to create steam to drive a generator and produce elec-
tricity. Only certain radionuclides, known as "fissile" nuclides, are subject to fission.
Uranium-235 is the only fissile nuclide that occurs naturally to any significant extent.
Other fissile nuclides are man-made. The principal man-made fissile radionuclide is
plutonium-239, which is produced when uranium-238 absorbs a neutron. See id. at
13-14.
18. See id. at 37-38.
19. See NICHOLAS LENSSEN, WORLDWATCH INST., NUCLEAR WASTE: THE PROBLEM
THAT WON'T Go AWAY 9 (1991).
20. Great Britain and France still do commercial reprocessing. Until its collapse,
so did the former Soviet Union. See Gerrard, supra note 2, at 1076 n.190.
21. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 16, at 38 (1993).
22. See id. at 38-39. See also Gerrard, supra note 2, at 1075.
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generated spent fuel has been reprocessed in the United States
since 1976.23
III. Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States: Its Sources
and Characteristics
A. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: The Sources of Spent
Nuclear Fuel
1. Brief History
The first five commercial nuclear power plants were ordered
in 1955. The first commercial plant began operation in 1960.24
There were fifteen operating plants in the United States by 1970,
and seventy-two by 1980. The number of operating commercial
nuclear plants in the United States peaked at 112 in 1990, re-
maining at that level until 1992.25 Those plants were located at
seventy sites in thirty-three states. 26 Since 1992, eight commer-
cial nuclear plants have permanently closed in the United
States.2 7 Only one new plant has opened. 28 While there are three
previously ordered plants, which at this writing technically still
23. While originally expected to be the solution to the accumulation of spent fuel
from nuclear power plants, commercial reprocessing proved both economically unat-
tractive and environmentally disastrous in the United States. Of the three reproces-
sing plants constructed in the United States, one (West Valley, N.Y.) operated for six
years but left a legacy of contamination, fires, and accidents; the second (Morris, Ill.)
was completed but never opened because it did not work; and the third (Barnwell,
S.C.) was never finished because of massive cost overruns. See Gerrard, supra note 2,
at 1075-76 n.190.
24. See James Quirk & Katsuaki Terasawa, Nuclear Regulation: An Historical
Perspective, 21 NAT. RES. J. 833, 836 (1981). The first commercial plant in operation
was Commonwealth Edison's Dresden 1, which permanently closed in 1978. Compare
id. at tbl. 1, with OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF EN-
ERGY, SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS 1994-2042 A.3 (1995) [hereinafter SPENT
FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS].
25. See K.S. SCHRADER-FRECHETTE, BURYING UNCERTAINTY 11 (1993). Through-
out the world, there were 418 commercial nuclear power plants operating in twenty-
six nations to start in 1992.
26. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
LOCATIONS OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE ULTI-
MATELY DESTINED FOR GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL (1994) [hereinafter LOCATIONS OF SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL]. This count reflects only the states and sites, which had operating
reactors at the beginning of 1992; there was one additional state (Colorado) and there
were three additional sites with closed reactors at that time.
27. San Onofre 1, Yankee Rowe, Trojan, Big Rock Point, Haddam Neck (a/k/a
Connecticut Yankee), Maine Yankee, and, most recently, Zion 1 and 2.
28. The Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar 1, in 1996.
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have Nuclear Regulatory Commission construction permits,29 it is
highly doubtful they ever will be completed.30
The first fifteen plants ordered between 1955 and 1962 all in-
cluded small prototype reactors funded by the Atomic Energy
Commission under the Power Reactor Demonstration Program.31
Commercial sales of reactors began in 1963, but many of the
plants ordered between 1963 and 1966 were "turnkey" projects
built under fixed price contracts by the two major domestic reactor
manufacturers, General Electric and Westinghouse. 32 Following
1966, with only one or two exceptions, nuclear plants have been
ordered on strictly commercial terms. 33 The number of new plants
ordered peaked at thirty-six in 1973.3 4 No new commercial power
plants have been ordered in the United States since 1978; none of
the plants ordered after 1973 were completed.35
2. Current Status
At present, there are 104 operational commercial nuclear
plants in the United States with a combined generating capacity
of approximately 100,000 megawatts. Nuclear power accounted
for approximately twenty percent of the nation's electricity pro-
duction in 1997, compared to almost twenty-two percent in 1996.36
All operating commercial nuclear plants in the United States
use light-water reactors to produce steam. The steam drives a
turbine-generator, which produces electricity. Commercial plants
use two types of light-water reactors: boiling water and pres-
surized water reactors. In both types, water is circulated through
the reactor core to absorb heat and to moderate the fission pro-
cess. In a boiling-water reactor, water is boiled and steam is pro-
duced inside the reactor vessel. In a pressurized-water reactor,
water in the reactor vessel is pressurized to prevent it from boil-
ing. Instead, the pressurized, super-heated water is circulated to
29. The Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar 2 and Bellefonte 1 and 2.
30. See PLAN. INFO. CORP., THOMPSON PROF. GROUP, & DECISION RES. INST., Nu-
CLEAR WASTE PROJECTS OFFICE, STATE OF NEVADA, AN INDEP. COST ASSESSMENT OF
THE NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAM 26 (1998) [hereinafter INDEP.
COST ASSESSMENT].
31. See Quirk & Terasawa, supra note 24, at 835.
32. See id. at 836.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Dan M. Berkovitz, Pariahs and Prophets: Nuclear Energy, Global Warm-
ing, and Intergenerational Justice, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 245, 247 (1992).
36. See Barnaby J. Feder, Nation's Biggest Atomic Utility to Shut 2 Units, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at A10.
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another vessel, called a steam generator, where steam is
produced. 37
3. Projected Future Status Pending Electric Utility
Disaggregation and Deregulation
Based on official Department of Energy (DOE) projections, 38
there will be still be 104 operating reactors at year-end 2000, a
number which will decline to eighty-nine at year-end 2010, forty-
three at year-end 2020, and only two at year-end 2030.39 The last
U.S. commercial nuclear plant is projected to close by year-end
2035.40
In 2000, nuclear plants are expected to account for twenty
percent of electricity production in the United States.41 By 2010,
nuclear power is projected to represent only fifteen percent of the
nation's electricity. 42 By 2020, it is expected to decline to approxi-
mately nine percent. 43 By 2030, it is forecast to be negligible. 44
B. Spent Nuclear Fuel: Its Characteristics and Amounts
1. Constituent Elements
There are more than thirty elements which are produced by
the fission process in a nuclear reactor and found in spent nuclear
fuel. These elements are products of both the nuclear fuel and the
cladding in which it is contained. 45
37. See OFFICE OF CILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
OCWRM TRANsP. REP. 1 (1995) [hereinafter TRANsP. REP.].
38. See id. These projections were adjusted to eliminate TVA's hypothetically
planned but effectively cancelled Watts Bar 2 and Bellefonte 1 and 2 plants.
39. See SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 24, at tbl. A-1. These
projections assume no new plants are ordered and existing plants operate for their
license periods, without early closures or license extensions.
40. Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar 1, in 1996. See SPENT FUEL STORAGE
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 24, at tbl. A-1.
41. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLooK
1998 PROJECTIONS, app. tbl. 8 (1997).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 24, at tbl. A-1.
45. Nuclear fuel products created by the fissioning of uranium-235 include radio-
active isotopes of strontium, cesium, promethium, krypton, curium, ruthenium, zirco-
nium, barium, iodine and xenon. Products of the fissioning of uranium-238 include
radioactive isotopes of the transuranic elements of plutonium, neptunium, amer-
icium, curium, berkelium, and californium. The fission process also produces from
the fuel cladding radioactive isotopes of a number of other elements, including zirco-
nium, chromium, tin, iron and nickel, along with much smaller quantities of manga-
nese, silicon, phosphorus, carbon, sulfur, selenium. Also produced from the fuel
cladding are small amounts of niobium, tantalum and molybdenum, and trace
[Vol. 18390
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2. Physical characteristics
Nuclear fuel is packaged in long, thin, metal-clad rods, which
are then bundled in assemblies. While there is considerable varia-
tion in individual assemblies, a typical fuel assembly is about
fourteen to fifteen feet long, about nine inches square in a pres-
surized-water reactor, and about five inches square in a boiling-
water reactor.46 In a boiling-water reactor, there are typically
sixty-three fuel rods per fuel assembly, with each assembly weigh-
ing 320 kg (705 lbs), having a nominal volume of 0.0864 m' (3.05
ft 3) containing 0.183 metric tons of uranium (MTU).47 In a pres-
surized-water reactor, there are typically 264 fuel rods per assem-
bly, with each assembly weighing 658 kg (1451 lbs), having a
nominal volume of 0.1860 m3 (6.57 ft3) and containing 0.461
MTU. 48
3. Radioactive Characteristics
Spent nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and thermally very
hot. At discharge, each metric ton initially produces nearly 180
million curies of radioactivity and generates 1.6 megawatts of
heat.49 By comparison, it has been estimated that, ten days after
the initial explosion, the nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl re-
leased 50 million curies.50 Because many of the radioactive iso-
topes in spent fuel decay quickly, its level of radioactivity falls to
693,000 curies and its thermal output to 12,500 watts per ton a
year after removal from the reactor. 51 However, even after 10,000
years, each ton of spent fuel still emits hazardous levels (470 cu-
ries) of radioactivity and measurable amounts (fourteen watts) of
heat.52
amounts of cobalt, titanium, and aluminum. See Richard Ausness, High-Level Radio-
active Waste Mgmt.: The Nuclear Dilemma, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 707, 727-30 (1979).
46. See TRANsP. REP., supra note 37, at 1.
47. See OFFICE OF CVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT. SYSTEM: TOTAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 6 (1997),
available at http'//www.rw.doe.gov (last visited Nov. 28, 2000) [hereinafter TOTAL
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION].
48. See id.
49. See LENSSEN, supra note 19, at 9.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 9-10.
52. See id. at 10.
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4. Threats to Human Health and the Environment
Spent nuclear fuel is perhaps the most dangerous radioactive
waste of all in terms of its threat to human health and the envi-
ronment. 53 Even though it accounts for less than one percent of
the volume of all radioactive waste in the United States, it con-
tains ninety-five percent of the radioactivity from all civilian and
military sources combined. 54 Each radioactive isotope in spent
fuel has its own characteristic duration and level of radioactivity,
emitting varying levels of alpha and beta particles and gamma
rays for varying lengths of time. 55 It is these particles and rays
that cause harm to living tissue and threat to the environment.5 6
Typically, the level of radiation at a point in time is measured in
curies and duration of radioactivity over time is measured in
53. See id. at 9.
54. See LENSSEN, supra note 19, at 9.
55. See id. at 8-9.
56. Radiation causes damage to living tissue at the cellular level by transferring
energy by means of ionization. Although they have little penetrating power, alpha
particles cause intense ionization along their paths. As a result, internal exposure to
alpha radiation is generally much more harmful than external exposure. Beta parti-
cles ionize less intensely, but penetrate more deeply than alpha particles. Gamma
rays penetrate very deeply into tissues at the cellular level and ionize uniformly along
their paths. External exposure to high-level gamma radiation can be very dangerous.
The amount of energy transferred by ionization can be measured. The rad is the unit
of absorbed energy in tissue; the roentgen is the unit of transmitted energy in air.
The rem measures the relative biological damage caused by multiplying the absorbed
dose in rads by a relative effectiveness factor. One rad of beta or gamma radiation is
equal to one rem, while one rad of alpha radiation is equivalent to ten rems. As far as
external exposure is concerned, the most immediate and dramatic biologic effects are
produced by whole-body exposure to high doses of penetrating radiation. Doses over
600 reins usually cause death within a few weeks, while doses of between 150 and 600
rems may be fatal but also provide some chance of recovery. Radiation sickness may
be caused by doses as low as 100 rems. External exposure to high but non-lethal
levels of radiation may have serious human health effects. For example, sub-lethal
levels of total body irradiation can cause leukemia and exposure to gamma radiation
can cause cataracts and thyroid cancer. Exposure to even low levels of ionizing radia-
tion, particularly where it is chronic, can also cause genetic changes in living orga-
nisms. This effect can be particularly significant where small doses of radiation are
received by large numbers of individuals in a particular population through which
radiation may introduce as many mutant genes as would large doses into small num-
bers of individuals. Even very low levels of radiation exposure can be dangerous
when radioactive substances are ingested, inhaled or injected. This is because the
radiation can diffuse throughout the entire body or concentrate in particular organs
or tissue, depending on the substance. For example, radium, strontium and barium,
which are chemically similar to calcium, are absorbed in bone, often causing bone
cancer. Plutonium also accumulates in bone, while radioactive iodine accumulates in
the thyroid gland, posing strong cancer risks. Inhaled plutonium is extremely dan-
gerous, both in terms of short-term toxicity and long-term cancer risks. All these sub-
stances are present in spent nuclear fuel. See Ausness, supra note 45, at 713-15.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss2/8
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"half-lives," where a half-life is the amount of time it takes for fifty
percent of the isotope's current level of radioactivity to decay.57
Generally, the radioactive isotopes in spent fuel are considered
dangerous to human health and the environment for at least ten
and, in some cases, as many as twenty half-lives. 58 Thus, shorter-
lived fission products, such as strontium-90 and cesium-137 with
thirty year half-lives, require isolation from the environment for
600 years before being considered safe.59 By contrast, long-lived
transuranics, such as plutonium-239, remain hazardous for at
least 240,000 and perhaps as many as 500,000 years. 60
5. Current and Projected Amounts of Spent Fuel
At the end of 1997, there were estimated to be between 36,100
and 36,800 MTU of spent fuel from commercial nuclear plants in
temporary storage. 61 This equated to approximately 125,000
spent fuel assemblies.6 2 Additional spent fuel is currently being
generated at the rate of approximately 2,000 MTU and 7,000 as-
semblies per year.63 The DOE has projected that by 2030, the cu-
mulative amount of spent fuel discharged by commercial reactors
will be 84,100 MTU in 293,000 assemblies. 64 By 2035, the cumu-
lative amount of spent fuel discharged has been projected by a pri-
vate consultant to reach a maximum of approximately 87,000
MTU in 299,000 assemblies. 65
6. Current Storage of Spent Fuel
Currently, virtually all commercial spent fuel is being stored
at the site of the reactor that generated it.66 Most commercial
spent fuel is being stored in steel-lined, water-filled pools below
57. See LENSSEN, supra note 19, at 9.
58. See Ausness, supra note 45, at 746; see also LENSSEN, supra note 19, at 9.
59. See Ausness, supra note 45, at 746.
60. See id.
61. See SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 24, at 4.3.
62. See id. at B-34.
63. See id. at 4.3, B-34.
64. See TOTAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTIoN, supra note 47, at 6.
65. See id. In addition to civilian spent fuel, DOE will eventually need to dispose
of defense wastes totaling approximately 2,700 MTU of spent fuel and 8,000 MTU
equivalent of other high-level wastes by 2035. See TRANSP. REP., supra note 37, at 2.
66. In June 1997, a consortium of nuclear utilities applied to the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission for a permit to store spent fuel and other high-level waste in dry
casks at the nation's first and only away-from-reactor "independent spent fuel storage
installation" (ISFSI) on the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation in Skull Valley,
Utah. See 62 Fed. Reg. 41,099 (July 31, 1997). This application is still pending at this
writing.
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ground-level at the site of the generating reactor. However, a
small but increasing amount of spent fuel is being stored in heavy,
thick-walled metal or concrete casks above-ground at reactor
sites.67 The current locations of storage sites for spent fuel and
other high-level wastes are shown in Figure 1, infra.68
IV. Commercial High-Level Nuclear Waste Policy in the
United States: History and Issues
A. History
1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Price-Anderson
Act of 1957
The Atomic Energy Act of 194669 restricted the possession
and use of nuclear technology to the federal government and pro-
hibited private ownership of nuclear facilities and materials.70
This policy was changed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,71
which established a program to encourage widespread private
participation in the development and use of nuclear power "to the
maximum extent consistent with the common defense and secur-
ity and with the health and safety of the public."72 The 1954 Act
authorized private industry to own and operate nuclear facilities
and use nuclear technology under license from and regulation by
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). 73
Private industry was initially reluctant to accept the federal
government's invitation to develop commercial nuclear power.
Nuclear technology was unproven in commercial use and posed
liability risks not associated with other means of generating elec-
tricity for commercial use.7 4 While both the federal government
67. See LOCATIONS OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, supra note 26, at 1 (unnumbered).
Sites currently using aboveground dry storage include Virginia Power's Surry Plant,
Carolina Power & Light's H.B. Robinson Plant, Duke Power's Oconee Nuclear Sta-
tion, Colorado Public Service Company's closed reactor at Fort St. Vrain, Baltimore
Gas & Electric Company's Calvert Cliffs Plant, Wisconsin Electric Power's Point
Beach Plant and Michigan's Consumers Power Palisades Plant.
68. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 1997 12 (1999).
69. Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (superseded by Atomic Energy Act of 1954).
70. See id. at §§ 4-5.
71. Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2283
(1994 & Supp. 1997)). See Diane C. Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal Sys-
tem's Response to Nuclear Power, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 601-09 (1982).
72. Pub. L. No. 703, § 3(d), 68 Stat. 919, 922 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d)).
73. See id. at §§ 41, 53, 68 Stat. 919, 928-31 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2061, 2073).
74. See, Daniel W. Meek, Note, Nuclear Power and the Price-Anderson Act: Pro-
motion over Public Protection, 30 STAN. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978).
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and the utility industry believed such risks were remote, the mag-
nitude of potential damages was so huge that private insurance
companies would not underwrite those risks.75 In response, the
Price-Anderson Act76 was enacted in 1957 to limit the liability of
nuclear utilities 77 and remove this obstacle to private investment
in nuclear power.78
2. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
The development of commercial nuclear power was super-
vised by the AEC until 1974. The Energy Reorganization Act of
197479 created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA),
divided the responsibilities of the AEC between them, and abol-
ished the AEC. This reorganization represented a Congressional
response to concerns about the AEC being responsible for both
promoting nuclear power as a viable commercial option and regu-
lating nuclear plant safety, by assigning promotional functions to
ERDA and safety responsibilities to the NRC.80 The NRC became
responsible for developing procedures for commercial nuclear
plants to follow in order to protect the public and the environment
from the hazards of spent fuel and other radioactive wastes gener-
75. See Maleson, supra note 71, at 602.
76. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957).
77. The Price-Anderson Act limits the aggregate liability of nuclear utilities and
Department of Energy contractors arising out of "nuclear incidents" at nuclear plants
or in the course of transportation of nuclear materials. The term "nuclear incident"
means "any occurrence . . .within the United States causing, within or outside the
United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to prop-
erty, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic,
explosive or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear or byproduct mate-
rial." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). Spent nuclear fuel is a "byproduct material" within the
meaning of this definition. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e). Price-Anderson also defines the
method by which the financial resources necessary to meet this limited liability will
be provided and apportions responsibility for providing them. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(e)(1). The current limit of apportioned liability for an incident at a commer-
cial nuclear plant is $63 million per plant, resulting in an aggregate limit per incident
of approximately $7 billion. While the Act clearly limits the liability of the private
sector, it does not limit the liability of the federal government, which Congress is to
determine for each incident on a case-by-case basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2).
78. See James H. Davenport, The Law of High-Level Nuclear Waste, 53 TENN. L.
REV. 481, 521 (1986).
79. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1994).
See generally Marcus A. Rowden, Nuclear Power Regulation in the United States: A
Current Domestic and International Perspective, 17 ATOM. ENERGY L. J. 102 (1975).
80. See Maleson, supra note 71, at 603 n.35.
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ated by commercial reactors. ERDA became part of the Depart-
ment of Energy when it was established in 1977.
3. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
The procedures developed by the NRC to consider the envi-
ronmental and public safety impacts of the radioactive wastes
generated by commercial nuclear power plants were soon chal-
lenged as violative of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)81 in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC.8 2
Under NEPA, an agency taking a major federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the environment is required to prepare an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) evaluating the action's
environmental effects.8 3  Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) contended that NEPA required the NRC to consider the
environmental impacts of radioactive waste disposal and spent
fuel reprocessing in each commercial reactor licensing proceeding,
but the NRC concluded that these issues should be reviewed only
during the licensing of waste disposal or reprocessing facilities.8 4
The D.C. Circuit found the NRC's approach to be violative of
NEPA for two reasons.8 5 First, NEPA had been enacted to assure
that all the environmental consequences of an action would be
evaluated together before the action, not separately after the ac-
tion. Second, once a power plant had been licensed and started to
operate, the decision to produce waste had been made and the
only question was what to do with it. Thus, according to the Court
of Appeals, NEPA required the NRC to consider the environmen-
tal impacts before the wastes were produced and, absent generic
proceedings, individual reactor licensing proceedings were the
proper time to consider the impacts.8 6
However, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, ruling that the
appellate tribunal had exceeded its authority and invaded the
province of the NRC.R7 The Court reasoned that the legislative
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1994).
82. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See also Maleson, supra note 71, at 621-24.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(1)-(v).
84. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 533-35.
85. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d at 640-41.
86. See id. at 646-54.
87. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 556-58; see also Maleson, supra note 71, at
623-24.
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history of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) showed that
Congress intended that administrative agencies have broad dis-
cretion with respect to their procedures, discretion which review-
ing courts could curtail only when constitutional issues or
extremely compelling circumstances were presented.88 The Court
concluded that the unresolved public safety and environmental
protection issues associated with nuclear waste had been sub-
sumed in the fundamental policy decision by Congress "to at least
try nuclear energy."8 9 Because Congress had made this basic pol-
icy decision and established a reasonable review process for its im-
plementation by the NRC, the courts were to play only a limited
role and the policy was "not subject to reexamination in federal
courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action."90 As a
result of the Vermont Yankee decision, the unresolved public
safety and environmental protection issues associated with nu-
clear waste were defined as policy issues and deferred for future
attention by the legislative and executive branches.
4. Presidential Policy Statement of 1980
After the DOE was created in October 1977, the Carter ad-
ministration began an interagency review to reassess existing pol-
icy toward nuclear waste disposal. However, this effort did not
culminate in formal policy proposals until the President sent a
message to Congress on February 12, 1980.91 This message out-
lined a comprehensive national radioactive waste management
program, the key elements of which included:
* Federal, state and local government would share responsi-
bility for safe management and disposal of nuclear waste,
with siting decisions governed by the principle of "consulta-
tion and concurrence";
* Pending reviews required under NEPA, an interim plan was
adopted for disposal of high-level and transuranic wastes in
"mined geologic repositories," with four or five alternative
sites to be evaluated and the initial repository sited by 1985
and operational by the mid-1990s;
88. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 545-46.
89. Id. at 557-58.
90. Id. at 558.
91. Presidential Message and Fact Sheet of February 12, 1980, reprinted in THE
POL. OF NUCLEAR WASTE 220 (E. William Colglazier, Jr. ed., 1982) [hereinafter Presi-
dential Message].
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* Until a permanent geologic repository became available, safe
interim storage of commercial spent fuel at reactor sites
would continue to be the responsibility of the generating
utilities, but legislation would be sought to authorize limited
away-from-reactor (AFR) facilities for domestic spent fuel
which could not be stored on-site and foreign spent fuel
when the objectives of U.S. nonproliferation policy would be
served;
* The Department of Energy would continue to have the pri-
mary responsibility for implementation and integration of
the program at the federal level, with the primary planning
mechanism to be a comprehensive, interagency "National
Plan for Nuclear Waste Management" subject to public input
and Congressional review. 92
The Carter proposal was premised on a number of basic policy
principles. First, the technical program would be required to meet
all of the relevant radiological protection criteria, as well as other
applicable regulatory requirements, with risks "reduced to the
lowest level practicable."93 Second, the responsibility for estab-
lishing a nuclear waste management program would be under-
taken by the same generation of Americans which had begun
producing the waste and not deferred to future generations.
Third, the program would include consideration of all aspects of
the waste issue, "including safety, environmental, organizational
and institutional factors."94 Fourth, the basic elements of the pro-
gram should be independent of the number of commercial nuclear
reactors and the specific fuel cycle technologies or reactor designs
chosen by the nuclear industry.95 Additionally, the President's
message declared, "The principle that will be applied to financing
the cost of nuclear waste management and disposal is that the
cost should be payed [sic] by the generator of the waste and borne
by the beneficiary of the activity generating the waste."96 Specifi-
cally, this principle meant, "utilities will pay the cost of storage
and disposal of waste from power plant operations and pass those
costs on to their customers. The government will pay the cost of
storage and disposal of wastes from defense and government R&D
activities and finance it from tax revenues."97
92. Id. at 221-26.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 227.
96. Presidential Message, supra note 91, at 232.
97. Id.
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5. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
Congress did not respond to the Carter Administration recom-
mendations until 1982, when it enacted and President Reagan
signed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA).98 The NWPA di-
rected DOE to identify suitable sites for, and then to construct and
operate two geologic repositories, with the specified search criteria
essentially requiring the first to be located in the western United
States.9 9 In order to provide geographic equity (and political pal-
atability), the NWPA limited the waste disposed at the western
repository to 70,000 metric tons of spent fuel and directed that a
search be initiated for the site of a second repository according to
criteria which virtually assured it would be located in the eastern
United States100 The first repository was to begin receiving spent
fuel by January 31, 1998.101 The civilian share of the costs for
siting, constructing and operating the repositories and transport-
ing and managing the wastes disposed there was to be paid
through appropriations by Congress from a Nuclear Waste Fund
(NWF) financed by a fee of one mill (one tenth of a cent) per kilo-
watt-hour of electricity generated and sold by commercial nuclear
reactors. 102
The NWPA required DOE to consider various geological, tech-
nical and geographical factors to evaluate the suitability of poten-
tial repository sites. 10 3 DOE was directed to identify five sites for
preliminary evaluation as the location for the first repository,
from which it would recommend three to the President for more
detailed evaluation or "characterization" not later than January 1,
1985.104 Similarly, DOE was charged with identifying five sites
for further evaluation and recommending to the President by Jan-
uary 1, 1989 which three should be "characterized" for the second
98. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2202 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 10101-10270 (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 10132(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C) (1982), amended or repealed by
Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-
104 and Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5011(b), 101 Stat. 1330-228.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 10132(b)(1)(C) (1982), repealed by Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-104 and Pub. L. No.
100-203, § 5011(b), 101 Stat. 1330-228. See Berkovitz, supra note 35, at 260 n.53.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5) (1982).
102. See id. § 10222(a)(2)-(3).
103. See id. § 10132(a).
104. See id. § 10132(b)(1)(A)-(B).
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repository. 10 5 The President would then either accept or reject
each of DOE's recommendations. 10 6 After characterizing each site
approved by the President, DOE would recommend one to be the
location of a repository. 10 7 If the President approved the recom-
mended site, s/he would formally nominate the site to Congress.108
An affected state or Indian tribe could veto the President's nomi-
nation, in which case the selection would be invalidated unless the
veto was overridden by a majority vote of both houses of Con-
gress. 10 9 An NRC license would be required for the actual con-
struction and operation of the repository at the selected site." 0
DOE's implementation of the NWPA proved controversial
from the outset. While a broad consensus supported the Act in
concept, states in which sites under consideration for characteri-
zation were located raised numerous objections to DOE's site se-
lection process. As a result, DOE suspended the process for the
second repository prior to recommending any sites for characteri-
zation in order to shore up political support for continuing the pro-
cess for the first repository."' But, this patent submission to
pressure only compounded DOE's political problems regarding the
first repository, which were even further exacerbated by program
delays and cost increases resulting from technical and manage-
ment problems." 2
6. Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments of 1987
Congress responded to the political turmoil surrounding im-
plementation of the NWPA by enacting the Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA)." 3 The NWPAA short-cir-
105. See id. § 10132(b)(1)(C), repealed by Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-104 and Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5011(b), 101
Stat. 1330-228.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 10132(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(1) (1982), amended by Nuclear Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-104 and Pub. L. No. 100-203,
§ 5011(b), 101 Stat. 1330-228.
108. See id.
109. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10136(b), 10138(a), 10135(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
110. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10134(b), (d) (1982), amended by Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-104 and Pub. L. No.
100-203, § 5011(b), 101 Stat. 1330-228.
111. See Berkovitz, supra note 35, at 261.
112. See id.
113. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-227 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101
- 10270 (1994)). See generally Jeffrey D. Raeber, Comment, Federal Nuclear Waste
Policy as Defined by the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, 34 ST. Louis
U. L. J. 111 (1989); see also Berkovitz, supra note 35, at 261-62 (1992).
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cuited the selection process for the first repository and designated
Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the only site to be characterized by
DOE. 114 However, the 1987 Amendments retained the 1982 Act's
provision for state veto power over a site selection decision by the
President and its requirement for an NRC license for actual con-
struction of a repository. The NWPAA left unchanged the Janu-
ary 31, 1998 deadline for DOE to begin to accept spent fuel from
the commercial nuclear utilities. The Amendments also preserved
the NWF with its one mill-per-kilowatt-hour funding mechanism
for the Act's commercial waste program.
While the NWPAA was strongly supported by both DOE and
the nuclear industry, the new legislation did not solve the political
problems associated with repository siting. Predictably, the State
of Nevada and its elected officials mounted a concerted attack on
the NWPAA's pre-emption of the site selection process contem-
plated by the 1982 Act. Moreover, the patently political and mani-
festly unfair nature of that provision were so widely recognized
that the 1987 Amendments were commonly characterized on Cap-
itol Hill as the "Screw Nevada bill. ' "1 5 Moreover, the unresolved
public safety and environmental impact issues associated with nu-
clear waste disposal, which the Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee
decision had deferred for future consideration by the policy
branches of government, became present problems for policymak-
ers with enactment of the NWPAA.
The NRC had concluded in its "Waste Confidence Decision" of
August, 1984 that safe disposal of nuclear wastes in a geologic re-
pository was technically feasible; that at least one repository
would be available by 2007-2009; that sufficient repository capac-
ity would be available for all nuclear wastes from commercial re-
actors within thirty years after the cessation of operations at any
reactor; and that wastes could be safely stored at reactor sites, or
offsite, for at least thirty years. 116 The NRC reaffirmed this deci-
sion in 1990, although it did reflect the delays in the DOE reposi-
tory program by concluding that at least one repository would be
available not by 2007-2009, but "within the first quarter of the
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 10133 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
115. See Berkovitz, supra note 35, at 262; James Flynn & Paul Slovic, Yucca Moun-
tain: A Crisis for Policy: Prospects for America's High-Level Nuclear Waste Program,
20 ANN. REv. ENERGY & ENV'T 83, 95 (1995).
116. Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658 (Aug. 31, 1984) (codified as
amended at 10 C.F.R. § 51.23 (1998)).
402 [Vol. 18
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss2/8
20011 FINANCING FOR ETERNITY 403
twenty-first century," i.e. by 2025.117 But, these decisions as-
sumed that technical standards could be set which a repository
could meet that would provide reasonable assurance of public
safety and environmental protection - an assumption which came
under increasingly widespread and credible challenge at about the
same time the NWPAA was being enacted.
In particular, the First Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated,
in July 1987, the environmental standards for a repository which
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had promul-
gated in 1985,118 finding both the duration of prescribed protec-
tion and the specific limits set for groundwater protection set by
the agency to be arbitrary and capricious.11 9 Subsequently, in
1990, the Board of Radioactive Waste Management of the Na-
tional Research Council conducted a symposium of nuclear waste
experts and published an influential report of its results entitled
"Rethinking High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal," which chal-
lenged the theoretical basis of the EPA standards and criticized
117. Waste Confidence Decision Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,474 (Sept. 18, 1990) (codi-
fied at 10 C.F.R. § 51.23 (1998)). The NRC recently reaffirmed the findings of its 1990
Waste Confidence Review and, absent unexpected events, deferred any further review
until after "impending repository development and regulatory activities run their
course." See Status Report on the Review of the Waste Confidence Decision, 64 Fed.
Reg. 68,005, 68,007 (Dec. 6, 1999).
118. The standards issued by EPA in 1985 included four requirements for the long-
term disposal of high-level radioactive waste in geologic repositories:
(1) containment requirements, which were intended to limit the total re-
leases of radionuclides over the first 10,000 years of the repository's
existence to specified dose levels projected to cause no more than
1,000 premature deaths over the compliance period;
(2) individual protection requirements, designed to protect individuals
living in the vicinity of the repository for annual exposures in excess
of twenty-five millirems to the whole body or seventy-five millirems to
any critical organ for 1,000 years after disposal;
(3) groundwater protection requirements, which limited the concentra-
tion of radionuclides in groundwater in the vicinity of the repository
to levels somewhat above those specified under the Safe Drinking
Water Act for community water systems; and
(4) quality assurance requirements, which established various institu-
tional and procedural requirements for facilities not licensed by the
NRC.
Berkovitz, supra note 35, at 270-71 (summarizing requirements set in Environmental
Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and
Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,066 (Sept. 19, 1985)
(codified in 40 C.F.R. Pt. 191)).
119. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1293 (1st
Cir. 1987).
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the deadline-directed, geology-focused, and detail-oriented ap-
proach of the DOE repository program. 120
7. Title VII, Energy Policy Act of 1992
Responding to the increasing controversy, Congress passed
Title VII of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct). 121 In EPAct,
Congress directed the EPA to contract with the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study to determine and then to rec-
ommend, not later than December 31, 1993, the appropriate pub-
lic health and safety standards for the disposal of high-level
nuclear waste at the Yucca Mountain site designated for charac-
terization by the NWPAA. 122 EPA was charged with the respon-
sibility of issuing its public health and safety standards for the
Yucca Mountain repository within one year of receiving the NAS
study and recommendations. 123 However, the Conference Report
accompanying EPAct expressly provided that the EPA was not re-
quired to base its new standards on the NAS recommendations. 124
Also, the NRC was required to modify its licensing standards for a
Yucca Mountain repository to conform to the EPA standards
within one year of their issuance. 125
Despite the year-end 1993 deadline set by EPAct, the NAS did
not complete its study and forward its recommendations regard-
ing Yucca Mountain public health and safety standards until
1995.126 The standards recommended by the NAS differed in im-
portant ways from those originally promulgated by EPA in 1985.
In particular, the NAS recommended:
120. BD. ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, RETHINKING HIGH-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL (1990), reprinted in NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, RADIO-
ACTIVE WASTE LICENSING, app. A at 21 (1992).
121. Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 801-03, 106 Stat. 2921 (1992).
122. See id. at § 801(a)(2).
123. See id. at § 801(a)(1). These standards would apply only to the Yucca Moun-
tain repository; separate standards would apply to all other high-level nuclear waste
facilities. Shortly after enacting EPAct, Congress also passed the Waste Isolation Pi-
lot Plant Land Withdrawal Act, Pub. L. No. 102-579, § 8(b)(1), 106 Stat. 4777, 4786
(1992), which directed EPA, within six months, to promulgate standards for all other
facilities that would either reinstate or replace those remanded to the agency in Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1293 (1st Cir. 1987). See
supra note 118 and accompanying text.
124. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1018, at 391 (1992).
125. See Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801(b), 106 Stat. 2922 (1992).
126. See BD. ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, TECH. BASES FOR
YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS (1995) [hereinafter YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS].
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(1) the use of a standard that sets a limit on the risk to indi-
viduals of adverse health effects from radioactive releases,
rather than the standard adopted by EPA which sets a limit on
the dose of radioactivity received by individuals;
(2) that compliance with the standard be measured at the
time of peak risk, whenever that occurs, as contrasted with the
EPA approach of measuring compliance only for the first 10,000
years of the repository's existence; and
(3) the use of a standard which, unlike EPA's, does not in-
clude a risk-based calculation of the adverse effects of human
intrusion into the repository but does calculate the conse-
quences of an intrusion to assess the resilience of the
repository. 12
7
More generally, the NAS concluded that science simply could
not resolve all the issues necessary to set the standard, so that it
was important that the EPA rulemaking which set the standard
allow for "wide-ranging input from all interested parties" with re-
spect to the policy choices necessarily involved. 128 For example,
the NAS acknowledged that the level of risk which was acceptable
was necessarily a policy decision, with a "reasonable starting
point" being in the range of 10' to 106 adverse effects per year.129
Notwithstanding the EPAct deadline to promulgate new stan-
dards within twelve months of receipt of the NAS report, EPA did
not issue its proposed Yucca Mountain public health and safety
standards until late August 1999-approximately three years
late.130 From EPA's interim status report on the standards-writ-
ing process, it would appear that EPA struggled internally with
nine principal issues:
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id. at 3. The need for EPA to accommodate a wide range of viewpoints on
Yucca Mountain health and safety standards is not an idle concern on the part of the
NAS. For example, 65 different individuals and organizations from eighteen states
and the District of Columbia submitted a wide range of comments to EPA on the NAS
report recommendations. See RAYMOND L. CLARK, OFFICE OF RADIATION AND INDOOR
AIR, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY BACKGROUND ON 40 CFR PART 197 ENVTL. RADIATION PRO-
TECTION STANDARDS FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN (1998). Despite the fact that the NAS re-
port was intended to reduce uncertainty and produce consensus, its recommendations
have themselves generated new difficulty, complexity and controversy. See, e.g., K.
S. Shrader-Frechette, Academy Recommendations on the Proposed Yucca Mountain
Waste Repository: Overview and Criticisms, 8 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENV'T 25
(1997).
129. See YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, supra note 126, at 49.
130. See Envtl. Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 64
Fed. Reg. 46,976 (Aug. 27, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 197) [hereinafter Pro-
posed EPA Standards].
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(1) the definition of the critical group, i.e., determining
which subset of the exposed population would be most exposed;
(2) the form of the protection standard, i.e., dose limits, risk
limits, or a combination of the two;
(3) the level of the protection standard, i.e., how high the
dose and/or risk limits should be;
(4) how to define the biosphere from which the repository is
intended to isolate radionuclides;
(5) whether the level of the protection standard should be
set with reference to the concept of "negligible incremental risk,"
i.e., whether there is a level of individual dose which can, for
radiation protection purposes, be dismissed from consideration;
(6) the length of the compliance period, i.e., how long the
repository should be required to meet the protection standard;
(7) whether to reflect in the protection standard the risk
and consequences of human intrusion into the repository and, if
so, how;
(8) whether to include "assurance requirements" such as ac-
tive and passive institutional controls, monitoring, engineering
barriers, and waste retrievability as qualitative conditions on
the protection standard; and
(9) whether to include a separate protection standard for
ground water.1 3 1
EPA's proposed rule would resolve most of these issues, al-
though not necessarily in the manner recommended by the
NAS. 132 In particular, EPA proposed public health and safety
standards based on:
(1) the exposure of the "reasonably maximally exposed indi-
vidual" rather than the "critical group" recommended by the
NAS, which EPA concluded should be an individual engaged in
a "rural residential" rather than the "subsistence farming" lifes-
tyle recommended by the NAS; 133
131. See RAYMoND L. CLARK, OFFICE OF RADIATION AND INDOOR AIR, ENvTL. PROT.
AGENCY, ENvTL. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN: CONSIDER-
ATIONS ON ISSUES (1998).
132. EPA determined that, as a matter of law, it was not bound by the NAS recom-
mendations but should use them as a "starting point" for its proposed rule. See Pro-
posed EPA Standards, 64 Fed. Reg. 46,981-82 (Aug. 27, 1999).
133. Id. at 46,988.
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(2) an exposure limit defined in terms of radioactive dose
rather than health risk as recommended by the NAS;13 4
(3) a whole-body exposure limit of fifteen millirem per year,
which would be within the range recommended by the NAS; 1 3 5
(4) the use of assumptions about the future state of the bio-
sphere that reflect current technologies and living patterns but
vary geologic, hydrologic and climactic conditions, as recom-
mended by the NAS; 13 6
(5) acceptance of the NAS premise that an individual pro-
tection standard will serve to adequately protect both the local
and general population, but without adoption of the concept of
"negligible incremental risk" for exposure of the general popula-
tion recommended by the NAS; 13 7
(6) a compliance period of 10,000 years, rather than the pe-
riod of 1,000,000 years suggested by the NAS;13 8
(7) an assumption that human intrusion will occur in accor-
dance with a particular scenario designed to test the "resilience"
of the repository, as recommended by the NAS; 13 9
(8) no determination regarding whether "assurance re-
quirements" such as active and passive institutional controls,
monitoring, engineering barriers, and waste retrievability
should be imposed as qualitative conditions, an issue on which
EPA invited further comment and deferred decision to its final
rule;140 and
(9) a separate groundwater protection standard set at the
same levels for particular radionuclides as established by rule
under the Safe Drinking Water Act.141
134. See id. at 46,984. "Dose" is a measure of the amount of radiation received by
an individual from exposure to radionuclides, while "risk" is the probability of an indi-
vidual incurring an adverse health effect from exposure to radiation. See id.
135. See id. at 46,985. This standard uses a new dose calculation method known as
"committed effective dose equivalent" (CEDE). EPA believes that the proposed stan-
dard using the new calculation method establishes a risk level that is essentially
equivalent to the whole body standard of twenty-five mremlyr set in other, older regu-
lations, e.g. 40 CFR § 191.03(a), applicable to DOE storage and management of SNF.
EPA has rulemakings pending to update the older regulations. See 64 Fed. Reg.
46,983.
136. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,993.
137. Id. at 46,991.
138. Id. at 46,991.
139. Id. at 46,998.
140. Id. at 46,998.
141. Proposed EPA Standards, 64 Fed. Reg. at 47,000.
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8. 1996 OCRWM Program Plan
After enactment of the NWPAA in 1987, "the DOE's civilian
radioactive waste management program . .. progressed more
slowly than expected."1 42 The reasons for the slow progress were
several, with their comparative importance subject to heated de-
bate. Certainly, intergovernmental conflict played a role, with of-
ficial opposition by the State of Nevada increasing substantially in
response to the "Screw Nevada bill."14 3 Scientific disputes also
plagued the program, with controversies developing over the
Yucca Mountain site's vulnerability to catastrophic geologic
events and human intrusion. 144 There were also many complaints
from a variety of sources of DOE management problems, particu-
larly failures to meet program schedules, stay within program
budgets, maintain focus on program priorities, and to respond
timely and appropriately to program problems and criticisms. 145
142. NUCLEAR WASTE TECH. REVIEW BD., DISPOSAL AND STORAGE OF SPENT Nu-
CLEAR FUEL-FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE 7 (1996) [hereinafter RIGHT BALANCE].
143. E.g., Nevada passed a law in 1989 making storage of high-level radioactive
waste illegal. It then attempted to exercise its "state veto" in advance of formal selec-
tion by the President of the Yucca Mountain site and sued (unsuccessfully) when DOE
refused to recognize the premature veto. It also declined to issue environmental per-
mits required from the State for repository development, forcing DOE to file suit and
delaying certain site activities for up to three years. DOE has characterized these
actions as evidence of a "scorched-earth battle plan" that has substantially delayed
site characterization activities. See Flynn & Slovic, supra note 115, at 95-97.
144. One of DOE's scientists has theorized that Yucca Mountain is subject periodi-
cally to upwelling of groundwater, which could flood the repository and possibly cause
release of radioactivity into the environment-perhaps explosively. The occurrence on
June 29, 1992 of an earthquake measuring 5.6 on the Richter Scale and centered only
twelve miles from the repository site highlighted concerns over the site's vulnerability
to earthquakes-especially along the Ghost Dance Fault, which cuts directly through
the site from south to north. Another scientific issue has been the release of radioac-
tive carbon-14 as a result of the decay of nuclear waste canisters and the escape of the
radioactive element in gaseous form. See id. at 98-102.
145. In May 1993, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the reposi-
tory program was behind schedule, over budget, and facing numerous scientific uncer-
tainties. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR WASTE: YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT
BEHIND SCHEDULE AND FACING MAJOR SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES (1993). Program
costs were projected at more than $6 billion for site characterization alone, three
times the per-site estimate in 1987 and 100 times the 1981 estimate. Moreover, the
GAO reported that more than sixty percent of allocated funds were being spent on
management and administrative activities, and only about twenty-two percent on
critical scientific and technical activities at the site. In June 1993, the Nevada Con-
gressional delegation called for an investigation and high-level review of the DOE
program, which was echoed a month later by the State's governor. Several public
interest groups also asked President Clinton to initiate a comprehensive review of the
program in July, 1993. A number of members of Congress also sent letters to the
President requesting a review between August and October, 1993. The Nuclear
Waste Technical Review Board also suggested a major program review in a letter to
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss2/8
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These complaints culminated in Congress slashing fiscal year
(FY)1996 program funding and directing that program expendi-
tures and activities be focused on site characterization.146 In re-
sponse to these difficulties and criticisms, DOE conducted a
comprehensive review of its program and, in May, 1996, signifi-
cantly revised its Program Plan.147
As required by the FY 1996 funding authorization, the revised
Program Plan deferred licensing activities and concentrated avail-
able resources on the most significant outstanding technical and
engineering issues associated with Yucca Mountain site charac-
terization. The primary near-term objectives of the revised Pro-
gram Plan were: first, to complete a "viability assessment" of the
Yucca Mountain site by September 30, 1998;' 48 second, to submit
the Secretary of Energy's formal site recommendation to the Pres-
ident in 2001; and, third, if the Yucca Mountain site was recom-
mended and selected, to submit a repository license application to
the Secretary of Energy in November of 1993. See Flynn & Slovic, supra note 115, at
103-104. While DOE initiated its own internal review in 1993, the GAO concluded
that the review was "too narrow in scope and lack[ed] sufficient objectivity to provide
the thoughtful and thorough evaluation of the program that is needed." Id. at 104
(citing GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, NUCLEAR WASTE: COMPREHENSIVE REV. OF THE DISPOSAL
PROGRAM IS NEEDED (1994)). Additionally, in August 1994, the Nuclear Waste Strat-
egy Coalition, consisting of nuclear utility, state regulatory commission, and state at-
torney general representatives released a report critical of DOE program
management and calling for reassignment of its high-level nuclear waste responsibili-
ties to a federally chartered corporation. See Flynn & Slovic, supra note 115, at 103
(citing NUCLEAR WASTE STRATEGY COALITION, REDESIGNING THE U.S. HIGH-LEVEL Nu-
CLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROGRAM FOR EFFECTIVE MGMT. (1994)).
146. Specifically, the FY 1996 budget was cut from $520 million to $400 million,
with $85 million of that amount set aside for future development of an interim storage
facility-an effective reduction in repository program funding of approximately forty
percent. See RIGHT BALANCE, supra note 142.
147. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
DRAFT CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT. PROGRAM PLAN, REVISION 1 (1996) [here-
inafter REVISION 1].
148. The DOE defined the "viability assessment" to include four components:
(1) the preliminary design concept for the critical elements for the reposi-
tory and waste package; (2) a total system performance assessment,
based upon the design concept and the scientific data and analysis availa-
ble by September 30, 1998, describing the probable behavior of the reposi-
tory in the Yucca Mountain geological setting relative to overall system
performance standards; (3) a plan and cost estimate for the remaining
work required to complete a license application; and (4) an estimate of the
costs to construct and operate the repository in accordance with the de-
sign concept.
NUCLEAR WASTE TECH. REV. BD., REP. TO THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE SECRETARY OF
ENERGY - 1996 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (1997) [hereinafter FINDINGS &
RECOMMENDATIONS].
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the NRC in 2002. These near-term objectives were directed to-
ward the revised Program Plan's primary long-term goal of start-
ing repository emplacement operations in 2010.149
In the FY 1997 appropriations bill, the Congress endorsed the
"viability assessment" and directed that DOE complete it not later
than September 30, 1998.150 Other elements of the revised Pro-
gram Plan were more controversial. Both the NWPA and the
NWPAA had set a deadline of January 31, 1998, for the federal
government to begin to accept spent fuel from the commercial nu-
clear utilities. However, the plan established a goal of repository
operation beginning in 2010, and the Secretary of Energy had sub-
mitted Senate testimony in December, 1995, that repository oper-
ation would probably not start before 2015.151 Moreover, the Plan
assumed that Congress would not designate a site for a central-
ized interim storage facility until 1999.152 Because DOE esti-
mated that about four years would elapse between selection of an
interim storage site and the first receipt of commercial spent fuel
at the facility, 153 an interim storage facility would not be available
to receive commercial spent fuel any sooner than 2003. With the
Yucca Mountain repository not available to receive waste before
2015 and an interim facility not available to store spent fuel
before 2003, the commercial nuclear utilities were faced with con-
tinued at-reactor storage for a much longer period and a much
larger volume of waste than contemplated when the NWPA was
enacted in 1982, or even when it was amended in 1987.
This possibility became a definite prospect in May, 1995,
when DOE issued its Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Ac-
ceptance Issues, stating that it did not have an unconditional obli-
gation, and would not be able to accept spent fuel by January 31,
1998, in the absence of a repository or interim storage facility con-
structed under the NWPA.154 The agency also determined that it
had no authority under the NWPA to provide interim storage in
the absence of a facility authorized, constructed, and licensed in
149. See REVISION 1, supra note 147, at §§ 1.3.2-3.
150. See Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-206, Title III, 110 Stat. 2984, 2995-96 (1996).
151. Hearings on S. 1271 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 104th Cong. (1995) (Dec. 14, 1995 statement of Hazel R. O'Leary, Secretary,
U.S. Dep't of Energy), cited in RIGHT BALANCE, supra note 146, at 11 n.4 (1996).
152. See FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 148, at 5.
153. See id. at 5.
154. See 60 Fed. Reg. 21,793, 21,793-94 (May 3, 1995).
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accordance with the Act. 155 Finally, DOE ruled that, even if it did
have an unconditional obligation to accept waste beginning Janu-
ary 31, 1998, the Delays Clause of its Standard Contract for the
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel would provide an administrative
remedy for the agency's failure to meet the obligation. 156
By the end of 1995, approximately 32,000 metric tons of spent
fuel had been generated at seventy commercial nuclear reactor
sites nationwide.1 57 Unless a significant number of reactors
closed prior to the expiration of their licenses, spent fuel would
continue to be produced at the rate of approximately 2,000 metric
tons per year through 2010 and slowly decline to zero by the
2030's absent a material number of operating license exten-
sions. 158 If repository operations did not begin until sometime be-
tween 2015 and 2020 and the repository could accept 3,000 metric
tons per year as DOE assumed, almost 80,000 metric tons of spent
fuel would require storage for some period, and all the spent fuel
generated by current reactors during their licensed lives would
not be emplaced at the repository until 2050. This estimate
stands in marked contrast to the maximum of 40,000 metric tons
requiring storage and final emplacement in the mid-2020's that
had been assumed in the early 1980's.159
While the precise figures are subject to debate and dispute,
there is no doubt that at-reactor storage of much larger volumes of
spent fuel for much longer periods of time will cost the nuclear
utilities significant amounts of money. For example, DOE esti-
mated that the capital cost of developing at-reactor dry cask stor-
age facilities would average $20 to $30 million per plant and a
study sponsored by the nuclear utilities projected operating costs
for such facilities of approximately $2 million per site per year. 16 0
Once spent fuel is accepted by DOE for transport to a repository or
central interim storage facility, the costs of its emplacement or
storage are paid from the Nuclear Waste Fund. But, the costs of
at-reactor storage or off-site storage at private facilities are to be
paid directly by the nuclear utilities over and above their Nuclear
Waste Fund fees.161 Moreover, with no place to ship on-site spent
fuel, the nuclear utilities also face the necessity for delayed
155. See id. at 21,797.
156. See id.
157. See RIGHT BALANCE, supra note 142, at 9.
158. See id. at 10.
159. See id. at 11.
160. See id. at 14.
161. See id. at 15.
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decommissioning of closed plants, with its attendant uncertainties
regarding future costs and liabilities.162
9. Spent Nuclear Fuel Contract Litigation
A number of nuclear utilities, states, and state public utility
commissions sought judicial review of DOE's Final Interpretation
of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues. In Indiana Michigan Power
Co. v. Department of Energy,163 the D. C. Circuit rejected DOE's
interpretation of the NWPA and held that the agency did have an
unconditional obligation to begin to accept spent fuel no later than
January 31, 1998, even in the absence of a repository or interim
storage facility authorized, constructed, and licensed under the
NWPA.164 However, the court also ruled that it was premature to
determine the appropriate remedy, as DOE had not yet defaulted
on its obligation. 165
The prospect of DOE default on its waste acceptance obliga-
tion and indefinite at-reactor storage of spent nuclear fuel became
a reality for nuclear utilities in December 1996 when DOE sent
letters to all holders of its Standard Contract formally notifying
them that the Department would be unable to begin accepting
spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998.166 The agency also in-
vited the utilities to share their views as to how the indefinite de-
lay in waste acceptance could best be accommodated. In response,
much the same group of utilities, states, and state commissions as
had sued in Indiana Michigan Power Co. petitioned the D. C. Cir-
cuit for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel DOE to begin-to
accept spent fuel by the January 31, 1998 deadline. DOE opposed
the writ on the grounds that the petitioners had an adequate rem-
edy under the Delays Clause of the Standard Contract. In North-
ern States Power Co. v. Department of Energy,167 the court denied
the writ sought by petitioners, but did issue one to compel DOE to
comply with the court's prior mandate in Indiana Michigan Power
Co.168 Specifically, the court ordered DOE to proceed with con-
162. See RIGHT BALANCE, supra note 142, at 9
163. See Indian Michigan Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
164. See id. at 1277.
165. See id.
166. See OFFICE OF CMLIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
FISCAL YEAR 1996 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS SUMMARY 4 (1997).
167. See Northern States Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
168. See id. at 759.
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tractual remedies in a manner consistent with its unconditional
NWPA obligation to begin acceptance of spent nuclear fuel by Jan-
uary 31, 1998, and precluded DOE from concluding that any delay
in acceptance was unavoidable "on the ground that it has not yet
prepared a permanent repository or that it has no authority to
provide storage in the interim."169 Both the petitioners and DOE
sought Supreme Court review of the Northern States Power deci-
sion, but the Court denied certiorari. 170  The petitioners also
sought a "move fuel" order from the D.C. Circuit to implement its
mandate in Northern States Power, but the court denied that relief
on the grounds that the NWPA "requires the DOE to include an
unconditional obligation in the Standard Contract, [but] it does
not itself require performance," so "[b] reach by DOE does not vio-
late a statutory duty [or] provide a basis for a move-fuel order."1 71
Since the Northern States Power decision, eleven utilities
have filed suits in the Court of Federal Claims seeking, in the ag-
gregate, more than $4 billion in damages. 72 The Washington Post
has quoted industry predictions that owners of all of the nation's
nuclear plants will eventually sue for damages totaling between
$31 billion and $53 billion. 73 However, the results of litigation to
date have been mixed. In Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United
States, the Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of a nuclear util-
ity suing for breach of its standard contract and found DOE liable
for the breach, with the resulting damages to be determined in
subsequent proceedings. 174 But, in Northern States Power Co. v.
US., a different judge in the same court ruled that the petitioning
utility could not seek damages in a civil suit and directed the com-
pany to pursue its contract remedies at the agency level. 175
169. Id. at 760.
170. See Dep't of Energy v. Northern States Power Co., 525 U.S. 1016 (1998).
171. Northern States Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 1998 WL 276581, at *2 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
172. See Michael A. Bauser, Comment, Recent Decisions Concerning the DOE's
Commercial Radioactive Waste Disposal Program, 19 ENERGY L. J. 387, 394 (1998).
173. See Michael Grunwald, Lawsuit Surge May Cost U.S. Billions, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 1998, at Al.
174. See Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223, 237 (1998).
175. See 43 Fed. Cl. 374, 388 (1999). See also Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power
Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 448 (1998) (reaching an identical result). What rem-
edy, if any, will ultimately be available to the complaining nuclear utilities will appar-
ently be determined as a matter of contract, not statute and by the Federal Circuit,
not the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Dep't of
Energy, 211 F.3d 646, 648 (D. C. Cir. 2000).
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10. Recent Legislative Activity
With DOE's breach of its waste acceptance obligation under
its standard contracts an accomplished fact, indefinite at-reactor
storage the only proffered solution to the growing spent nuclear
fuel problem, and the legal remedies for this state of affairs uncer-
tain, the nuclear utilities and their allies turned to Congress for a
legislative remedy. In both the 104th Congress (1995-96) and the
105th Congress (1997-98), legislation was introduced in the House
and the Senate to require DOE to construct an interim storage
facility at the Nevada Test Site near Yucca Mountain and to begin
to accept and transport spent fuel to that facility by a date certain,
initially set as 1999, but subsequently changed to 2002 and then
2003. Among numerous other provisions, the bills also would
have facilitated designation, approval, and licensing of a Yucca
Mountain repository by legislatively mandating its public health
and safety standards, thereby pre-empting and short-circuiting
the highly controversial EPA rulemaking discussed earlier. Addi-
tionally, the bills would have redefined the funding formula for
the Nuclear Waste Fund to limit strictly the maximum and aver-
age fees DOE could assess nuclear utilities for the time period
that an interim storage facility and a repository were under
construction.
In 1996, S. 1936176 passed the Senate sixty-three to thirty-
seven, 177 but the House did not take up its companion measure,
H.R. 1020.178 In 1997, H.R. 1270179 passed the House 307 to
120180 and S. 104181 passed the Senate sixty-five to thirty-four, 8 2
but opponents blocked reconciliation of the two bills throughout
the 1998 session. 8 3 The reasons for the failure of legislation in
176. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996, S. 1936, 104th Congress (1996) (passed
Senate, July 31, 1996).
177. See Senate Passes Nuclear Waste Bill, But Fails to Get Veto-Proof Majority,
NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Aug. 1, 1996, available at 1996 WL 12719539-41.
178. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996, H.R. 1020, 104th Congress (1996).
179. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997, H.R. 1270, 105th Congress (1997).
180. See House Approves H.R. 1270 with Veto-Proof Margin, NUCLEAR WASTE
NEWS, Nov. 6, 1997, available at 1997 WL 13045188.
181. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997, S. 104, 105th Congress (1997) (passed Sen-
ate, April 15, 1997).
182. See Senate Passes Nuclear Waste Bill, But Lacks Veto-Proof Majority, Nu-
CLEAR WASTE NEWS, April 17, 1997, available at 1997 WL 10908310.
183. See Helen Dewar, Senate Stalls Action on Bill to Create Nuclear Dump, WASH.
POST, June 3, 1998, at A10.
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both the 104th and 105th Congresses 18  were the same: the ex-
plicit promise of a Presidential veto and the absence of the neces-
sary sixty-seven votes in the Senate to override it.185
The Clinton Administration threatened a Presidential veto of
the legislation for several reasons. First, the Administration op-
posed the construction of an interim storage facility, contending
that it would divert DOE attention and resources from the effort
to characterize, evaluate, and if appropriate, designate a perma-
nent repository at Yucca Mountain. Second, the Administration
asserted it is illogical to site an interim storage facility at the Ne-
vada Test Site until it is known whether Yucca Mountain will be
the site of a permanent repository. Third, the Administration re-
jected legislative mandating of the public health and safety stan-
dards for the repository, adamantly insisting that those standards
should be set by the EPA based on the best science available.'
8 6
As the 106th Congress opened in 1999, the battle lines be-
tween the Clinton Administration and the nuclear industry's al-
lies in the House and Senate were still drawn. Bills looking much
like their predecessors were introduced in both the House (H.R.
45) and the Senate (S. 608), except their title was now the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1999. Administration officials
were still threatening a veto if either bill passed as introduced.
However, new Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson suggested that
the President would be willing to sign a bill which dispensed with
interim storage, preserved EPA's authority to set public health
and safety standards for a Yucca Mountain repository, and pro-
vided for the DOE to take title to spent fuel at reactor sites.187
Bill sponsors responded with amendments to the Senate bill ad-
dressing some, but not all Administration concerns. As S. 1287,
this bill passed both the House and the Senate in early 2000, but
184. Multiple bills relating to nuclear waste policies were introduced in each house
during both the 104th and 105th Congresses; however, the bills discussed are the only
ones on which significant action was taken.
185. See Lori A. Burkhart, Nuclear Waste Debate Simmers on Capitol Hill, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., June 1, 1997, at 58; Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Dodging Suits and Pols, DOE
Digs In on Nuclear Waste, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1997, at 38.
186. See Clinton Will Veto S. 104 as it Stands, Grumbly Tells Senate Committee,
NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Feb. 6, 1997, available at 1997 WL 10908626; Burkhart,
supra note 185; Hearings on H.R.1270 Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power,
Committee on Commerce, 105th Congress (1997) (Apr. 29, 1997 Statement of Lake H.
Barrett, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of
Energy).
187. See Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Nuclear Waste's Slow Boil, PuB. UTIL. FORT., June
1, 1999, at 34-35.
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President Clinton vetoed it and the President's veto was sustained
in a very close but widely expected Senate vote.188
11. Private Interim Storage Facility
Because a Yucca Mountain repository would become availa-
ble, if at all, no sooner than 2010 and a Nevada Test Site interim
storage facility has been stalled by the threat of a Presidential
veto, the nuclear power industry has actively searched for a loca-
tion for a privately owned and operated central interim storage
facility for the spent fuel accumulating at reactor sites. Described
in NRC regulations as an "independent spent fuel storage installa-
tion"18 9 and frequently referenced by its acronym "ISFSI," a pri-
vate storage facility would be licensed to receive spent fuel
shipped from reactor sites and to store it above ground in dry cask
storage systems. In 1996, after several abortive attempts else-
where, a consortium of nuclear utilities led by Northern States
Power leased 840 acres of land for such a facility at the Skull Val-
ley, Utah, reservation of the Goshute Indian tribe. 190 In June,
1997, Private Fuel Storage, a limited liability company formed by
the utility consortium, applied to the NRC for a license to con-
struct and operate an ISFSI at the Skull Valley site, initially for a
period of twenty years.' 91 In 1998, Private Fuel Storage and the
Goshutes signed a contract for the construction and operation of
the Skull Valley ISFSI. 192 As proposed, the ISFSI would have the
capacity to hold approximately 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel,
almost half of the total amount projected to be generated by the
nation's commercial nuclear plants. 193 However, Utah Governor
Michael Leavitt has vowed to block use of the facility by any
means available, characterizing plans for the ISFSI as "an over-
188. See Senate Energy Committee Approves Compromise Nuclear Waste Bill, Nu-
CLEAR WASTE NEWS, June 17, 1999, available at 1999 WL 10309221; House Sends
HLW Bill to the White House; Veto Promised, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Mar. 23, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 12745444; and Senate Fails to Override Clinton's Veto of S. 1287
by Three Votes, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, May 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 12745605.
189. 10 C.F.R. § 72.3 (1998).
190. See John J. Fialka, Goshute Indians' Plan to Store Nuclear Waste for Eight
Utilities is Opposed by Utah Governor, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 26, 1998, at A24; William
Claiborne, Utah Resisting Tribe's Nuclear Dump, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at A3.
191. See NRC Notice of Consideration of Issuance of a Materials License for the
Storage of Spent Fuel and Notice of an Opportunity for a Hearing, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,099
(Jul. 31, 1997).
192. See Claiborne, supra note 190.
193. See Fialka, supra note 190.
416 [Vol. 18
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss2/8
FINANCING FOR ETERNITY
my-dead-body issue." 194 At this writing, NRC licensing proceed-
ings were still pending.
B. Major Outstanding Issues Pending Electric Industry
Restructuring
As the United States approached the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, it was clear that certain of the political compromises and pol-
icy choices incorporated in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as
enacted in 1982 and amended in 1987 must be re-evaluated in the
light of subsequent experience. Others may retain sufficient polit-
ical and technical support to survive into the new millennium. As
the century closed, the status of these compromises and choices
appeared to be as follows.
1. Monitored Retrievable Storage versus Permanent
Disposal
At this point, American policy remains committed to perma-
nent disposal in a geologic repository as the best long-term solu-
tion to the spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste problem.
DOE's 1998 "viability assessment" identified "no show-stoppers"
for the planned Yucca Mountain repository and work on Yucca
Mountain's characterization continues, with a formal recommen-
dation to be made to the President in 2001. However, there are
unresolved technical issues with Yucca Mountain and continuing
controversy as to whether "permanent" disposal of spent fuel and
high level-nuclear waste is even possible. Moreover, there are in-
creasing concerns regarding the ultimate cost of a geologic reposi-
tory. As a result, there continue to be credible calls for
abandonment of the geologic repository approach in favor of moni-
tored retrievable storage.
2. Repository Location and Development
At this juncture, it would appear that if there is to be a geo-
logic repository in the United States, it will be at Yucca Mountain.
Given the political dynamics, which resulted in Yucca Mountain's
presumptive designation in the 1987 NWPA Amendments, it ap-
pears practically impossible that any other sites could realistically
be considered if Yucca Mountain proves unsuitable as a repository
site. But, it is by no means certain that Yucca Mountain will be
194. See id.
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designated and approved as the repository site, let alone actually
operate as a functional waste disposal facility.
First, there are the nagging questions regarding Yucca Moun-
tain's geologic stability and groundwater permeability. Second,
there is the unresolved issue of the appropriate radiation protec-
tion standard. Third, there is the increasing concern about the
cost of constructing and operating the repository. Fourth, there is
the continuing doubt about DOE's ability to construct and operate
the repository at all, let alone as planned. Fifth, there is the grow-
ing public anxiety about the extended, widespread and frequent
transportation of spent fuel to a repository. Finally, in light of
these other issues, there is the political issue of whether the Con-
gress would be able to muster the votes needed to override the
expected veto by the State of Nevada.
3. Interim Storage and Related Transportation
It would appear that a DOE interim storage facility at the
Nevada Test Site will not be authorized, at least for several years.
The failure of mandated interim storage legislation in both the
104th and 105th Congresses presaged Congress's failure to over-
ride the Clinton veto in the 106th, given the similar political situa-
tions. However, in the 107th Congress, the situation could
change. There will be a new President and a Yucca Mountain des-
ignation decision in 2001. If Yucca Mountain is designated, but
its operation projected to be delayed to 2015 or later, a new Presi-
dent could find interim storage politically unstoppable, especially
if no agreement has been reached between DOE and the nuclear
utilities regarding legal and financial responsibility for on-site
storage. At that point, however, the privately-owned and operated
Skull Valley ISFSI, if it has been licensed and constructed, could
well prove to be both politically and practically preferable to a gov-
ernment-owned and operated facility at the Nevada Test Site. On
the other hand, if Yucca Mountain is not designated in 2001, the
rationale for the siting of an interim facility at the Nevada Test
Site would seem to lose most of its remaining force, both practi-
cally and politically. Of course, either a Nevada Test Site or a
Skull Valley location for an interim storage facility would still face
substantial opposition because of continuing political concerns
and public anxieties regarding the costs and risks associated with
transportation of 80,000 metric tons of spent fuel across much of
the country at the rate of 2,000 to 3,000 MTU per year for thirty
years.
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4. Public Health and Safety Standards
The 1987 NWPAA decision to characterize only the Yucca
Mountain site for a repository has inevitably and inextricably
linked the determination of public health and safety standards for
a high-level waste repository to the viability of the site for such a
repository. In effect, repository decision-making has become cir-
cular: Yucca Mountain should be the site of the repository if and
only if it can meet the proper public health and safety standards,
but the public health and safety standards are proper if and only if
Yucca Mountain can meet them. This circularity is the direct re-
sult of the legislative presumption enshrined in the NWPAA that
Yucca Mountain is the best site available for a geologic repository.
Of course, there are radioactive protection standards that ap-
ply to other facilities posing the risk of exposing human popula-
tions and the environment to radionuclides. Because none of
these other facilities involve wastes which will be so highly (and
lethally) radioactive for so long, it seems logical that the stan-
dards applied to a geologic repository should be at least as protec-
tive as the standards applied to other facilities. There is
continuing concern among credible critics that, no matter how it is
designed, the Yucca Mountain site can be shown not to meet such
standards. But, even more importantly, there is near unanimity
at this point that it is simply not scientifically possible to show
with any predetermined probability that any site, including Yucca
Mountain, would meet such standards for any period even re-
motely approaching the length of time the wastes buried there
would be hazardous to human health and the environment. In
brief, the time frame of human history is too short and our models
of repository behavior too crude to plausibly predict its perform-
ance for even a thousand years, let alone ten thousand or a
million.
As a result, the political grenade, which the policy-makers
tossed to the scientists in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, has re-
turned, still armed and dangerous. How safe is safe enough for a
geologic repository has once again become a policy, not a scientific
issue. As a policy issue, of course, the proper definition of radioac-
tive protection standards has also become a political issue. Re-
cently, the politics of the issue have been reduced to a single
divide: who should determine the appropriate standards, Con-
gress by statute or the EPA by rule. And, to date, no compromise
formula has been found.
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5. Financing
The NWPA requires DOE to estimate periodically the costs of
its spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposal program and
then assess the sufficiency of the Nuclear Waste Fund to cover
them. 195 DOE conducted studies of the adequacy of the Nuclear
Waste Fee at its current level of one mill per kilowatt-hour to fi-
nance the total life-cycle costs of the spent nuclear fuel and high-
level waste disposal program in 1990196 and 1996.197 Both of
these studies projected that the fee was adequate; however, critics
of the 1996 study suggested that it showed the current fee was
barely adequate, and would be inadequate if some of the question-
able assumptions used in the study were changed or permitted to
vary. In particular, the State of Nevada commissioned a study by
independent consultants which showed that DOE had under-esti-
mated total life-cycle costs by fifty-four percent in its 1996 re-
port. 198  An analysis performed by another independent
consultant retained by public interest groups concluded that DOE
had also over-estimated its revenues; an error which, if not cor-
rected, produces a Nuclear Waste Fund shortfall of at least $1.9
billion and, when combined with the Nevada consultant's revised
cost estimate, yields a Fund shortfall of $46.5 billion (in 1997 dol-
lars in the year 2017). 199
When DOE issued its Yucca Mountain "viability assessment"
in December 1998, the agency also updated its fee adequacy
study.200 This study also concluded that the current fee was ade-
quate under the assumptions made.201 However, it also recog-
nized that if program costs were more than 20% higher than
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(4) (1994). While the Act expressly calls for annual
reviews of fee adequacy, the DOE has to date only published the results of three re-
views-in 1990, 1996 and 1998.
196. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
NUCLEAR WASTE FUND FEE ADEQUACY: AN ASSESSMENT (1990).
197. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
NUCLEAR WASTE FUND FEE ADEQUACY: AN ASSESSMENT (1996).
198. See INDEP. COST ASSESSMENT, supra note 30, at 9.
199. See BRUCE BIEWALD & DAVID WHITE, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, INC.,
STRANDED NUCLEAR WASTE: IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRIC INDUSTRY DEREGULATION FOR
NUCLEAR PLANT RETIREMENTS AND FUNDING FOR DECOMMISSIONING AND SPENT FUEL
18-19 (1999), available at http://www.synapse-energy.com/Downloads/Stranded-Nu-
clear-Waste.doc.
200. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
NUCLEAR WASTE FUND FEE ADEQUACY: AN ASSESSMENT (1998).
201. See id. at 17.
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assumed, or if inflation rates were 15% higher and interest rates
15% lower than assumed, the fee would be inadequate.20 2
V. Electric Industry Restructuring in the United States
A. Origins, Nature and Status
The commercial nuclear waste policy of the United States re-
flected in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, has been
premised on the historic structure of the electric utility industry
in this country. This structure has been characterized largely by
electric utilities which vertically integrate the functions of genera-
tion, transmission and distribution, and are franchised by govern-
ment to provide retail electric service as regulated monopolies
within designated geographic service areas.
1. Traditional Paradigm: Government Regulation of
Privately-Owned, Vertically Integrated Monopolies
Since the First World War, the electric industry has been
dominated by investor-owned utilities. In 1917, for example, utili-
ties produced fifty-nine percent of the electricity generated, and
investor-owned utilities were responsible for ninety-six percent of
that production. 20 3 Technological change and economic consolida-
tion resulted in utilities becoming increasingly dominant as pro-
ducers, accounting for eighty-two percent of generation by
1945.204 The Depression and the New Deal brought a significant
expansion of "public power," electricity produced and sold by gov-
ernment- or cooperatively-owned utilities. By 1945, investor-
owned utilities accounted for 66.7%, public power represented
15.3%, and industry supplied eighteen percent of electricity pro-
duction. Industrial sources steadily declined after World War II.
Between 1965 and 1995, investor-owned utilities consistently gen-
erated between seventy and seventy-five percent of the electricity
produced in the United States.20 5 During the same period, gov-
ernment- and cooperatively-owned utilities generated approxi-
mately twenty percent, with the balance of electricity produced
generated by industrial and other sources. 20 6
202. See id. at 18.
203. See LEONARD S. HymAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT & Fu-
TURE 97 (5th ed. 1994).
204. See id. at 116.
205. See id. at 129, 149.
206. See id.
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Because of economies of scale and scope involved in the pro-
duction, transmission, and distribution of electricity, electric utili-
ties, whether privately or publicly owned, have traditionally been
vertically-integrated monopolies, owning or controlling the gener-
ating plants, transmission lines, and distribution systems re-
quired to produce electric power and deliver it to all the homes,
businesses and factories in a given geographic area. Because they
have traditionally and typically been privately-owned monopo-
lies, electric utilities have also been subject to government regula-
tion to assure adequate and non-discriminatory service and fair
and reasonable prices to their customers. 20 7
Government regulation has typically been performed by ap-
pointed or elected commissions which set prices and standards for
electric service using "cost of service" pricing. Since the enactment
of the Federal Power Act in 1935,208 prices and standards for
"wholesale" service have been regulated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission 20 9 (FERC), while prices and standards for
"retail" service have been determined by individual state public
utility commissions (PUCs). 2 10
The prices, called "rates," are set to permit the utility to gen-
erate enough revenue to cover its "operating expenses" (e.g.,
wages, fuel, maintenance), depreciation, and taxes, and to earn
sufficient profit, termed "net operating income," to provide its in-
vestors with a fair "rate of return" on the money they have in-
vested in the utility's plant and equipment, which is known as the
"rate base." A "rate of return" is "fair" if it is comparable to what
the utility's investors could earn at about the same time on an
investment of similar risk in an unregulated business. 211
207. See id. at 4-5.
208. Public Utility Act of 1935, Title II, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 791a to 828c (1994 & Supp. 1997).
209. The FERC was previously known as the Federal Power Commission. See gen-
erally Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Introduction to the FERC, available at
http://www.ferc.fed.us/intro/intro2.htm (last modified Jan. 19, 2001).
210. While it is intended to be a "bright line," the dividing line drawn by the Fed-
eral Power Act between "wholesale" (federal) and "retail" (state) jurisdiction has at
times proven to be both elusive and controversial. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
211. See HyMAN, supra note 203, at 4-5. For a more detailed discussion, see
CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, PUBLIC UTIL. REP., THE REG. OF PUB. UTIL. 171-432 (3d ed.
1993).
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2. Recent Developments: Structural Disaggregation and
Competition and Deregulation of Generation and
Marketing
Recently, the electric utility industry entered a period of dra-
matic change. This period was presaged by the passage of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA),212 in 1978, but re-
ally began with the enactment in 1992 of the Energy Policy Act.213
Because of increasing economic and environmental concerns asso-
ciated with the generation of electricity by large, coal- and nu-
clear-fueled central station generating facilities and the
technological development of increasingly cost-competitive alter-
native sources of power, competitive contracting for supplies of
electricity has become increasingly prevalent in the industry.214
By the early 1990's, a new sector of the electric industry, com-
monly known as "independent power producers," had developed,
with more than fifty major firms and many more smaller produc-
ers competing to supply power at wholesale. 215 These indepen-
dent producers have been offering "purchased power" at contract
prices well below the "avoided costs" being quoted for electricity
from new generating facilities constructed by traditional electric
utilities.216 Combined with the "open access" to bulk power trans-
mission facilities ordered by FERC in 1996,217 this low-cost pur-
chased power has put downward pressure on wholesale electricity
prices. Moreover, the availability of wholesale "purchased power"
at prices substantially below the average cost of utility generation
has resulted in increasing political pressure to introduce competi-
tion into retail power markets. 218 California became the first
state to legislate retail competition for its electric utility industry
in 1996;219 by this writing, an additional twenty-two states had
212. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C.).
213. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 16
and 42 U.S.C.).
214. See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets
and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electric Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1339-41, 1346-50 (1993).
215. See id. at 1349 (citing Paul L. Joskow, The Evolution of an Independent Power
Sector and Competitive Procurement of New Generating Capacity, 13 REs. IN L. &
ECON. 63, 73-100 (1991)).
216. See id.
217. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (1996).
218. See Black & Pierce, supra note 214.
219. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (West 1999).
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authorized retail competition for their electricity markets. 220
However, no federal legislation mandating, authorizing or facili-
tating retail competition nationally has yet been enacted. 221
With retail competition, traditional utilities are no longer mo-
nopoly suppliers of electricity within their franchised service ar-
eas. Customers have the legal right to purchase electricity
produced by alternative suppliers at market prices, 222 and the dis-
enfranchised monopoly utilities are legally obligated to "wheel"
power from other sources across their transmission and distribu-
tion systems.223 As a competitive power market develops, 224 the
generation and marketing of electricity are deregulated, while its
transmission and distribution remain regulated by state and fed-
eral authorities. 225
B. Implications for Commercial Nuclear Power
The disaggregation of the electric utility industry and the
phased deregulation of its generation and marketing sectors are
expected to have significant implications for the commercial pro-
duction and sale of commercial nuclear power. These implications
are both economic and political in character.
220. Through August 1999, twenty-one states had authorized retail competition by
legislation, two by regulation. See Oregon Enacts Restructuring Law, LEAPLETTER
(William A. Spratley & Assoc., Columbus, OH), July-August, 1999, at 1.
221. Numerous federal bills have been introduced in recent sessions by members in
both Houses of Congress since 1996. The Clinton Administration also offered succes-
sive versions of an Electric Utility Restructuring Act in both 1998 and 1999. To date,
none of these bills have even been reported from a full committee in either house.
222. The "power exchange" and "bilateral contracts" models are the two most
widely discussed approaches to competitive retail power markets. In the "power ex-
change" model, a wholesale spot market for electricity serves as the institution for
conducting power transactions within a certain geographic area. The power exchange
conducts an auction in which electric generators bid their supply amounts and electric
distributors submit their demand amounts at incremental points in time (e.g., half-
hourly, hourly), with the market price balancing supply and demand. Customers de-
manding electricity at points in time pay the market price set by the exchange for
those times. The "bilateral contracts" model is more decentralized, with individual
customers or groups of customers contracting directly with power suppliers for their
electricity. In actuality, the evolving power markets in jurisdictions which have au-
thorized retail competition are generally combinations or "hybrids" of these two ana-
lytical models. See LAWRENCE J. HILL, OAK RIDGE NAT. LABORATORY, ECON.
EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS IN RESTRUCTURING ELECTRIC MARKETS 26-31 (1996).
223. See Joseph P. Tomain, Electric Util. Restructuring: A Case Study in Gov't Reg-
ulation, 33 TULSA L. J. 827, 842-43 (1998).
224. See PETER Fox-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTIL. RESTRUCTURING 140-141 (1997).
225. See HILL, supra note 222, at 31-37.
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1. Economic Implications
Deregulation of the generation and marketing of electricity,
even when that state of affairs has largely been prospective, has
resulted in very strong economic pressures on the electric utility
industry to reduce its costs of doing business. 226 Deregulation
substitutes "unbundled" market pricing of electric generation for
"bundled" regulatory pricing of generation, transmission, and dis-
tribution combined. 227 As a result, deregulation focuses market
pressure on the price and cost of electric generation particularly.
Regulatory pricing under the historic paradigm has been de-
termined by the costs specific to a particular source of electric-
ity.228 Market pricing, by contrast, is determined by the supply
and demand for electricity in a particular market independent of
the costs specific to a particular source of electricity. If the re-
structuring of the industry proceeds as predicted, deregulation
will be associated with a significant escalation of competition
among generators of electricity. 229 The combination of market
pricing and the escalation of competition will provide a compelling
economic incentive for electricity generators to avoid or reduce
whatever costs they can and to stringently limit increases of other
costs. 230 Competitive market pressure will also provide a particu-
larly compelling economic incentive for electricity generators to
eliminate costs not incurred by their competitors. 231
The long-term effects of these market pressures on the gener-
ation and marketing of nuclear power are necessarily speculative,
especially given the historic level of federal government involve-
ment in regulating and promoting the commercial use of nuclear
energy. Moreover, these effects are the subject of considerable dis-
agreement, with electric industry restructuring being viewed as
both the death knell and the second coming of commercial nuclear
power. However, there does appear to be an emerging consensus
226. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Policy Statement on the Restruc-
turing and Economic Deregulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 10 CFR Part 50
(Aug. 19, 1997), available at http://www.nrc.gov/OPA/reports/drgstmt.htm [hereinaf-
ter NRC Final Policy Statement]; See also JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANS-
FORMATION 79-101 (1987).
227. See NRC Final Policy Statement, supra note 226.
228. See id. See also Nicholas S. Reynolds & Robert L. Draper, The Future of Nu-
clear Power, 8 NAT. RESOURCES. & ENV'T 9 (1994).
229. See NRC Final Policy Statement, supra note 226; See also Reynolds & Draper,
supra note 228.
230. See Reynolds & Draper, supra note 228.
231. See id.
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on the likelihood of certain general effects. First, the current de
facto moratorium on the construction of new plants is expected to
continue, with a focus instead of extending the operating licenses
of selected plants with the best safety records and economic per-
formance. 232 Second, existing plants with the worst safety records
and economic performance are expected to be permanently closed
prior to the expirations of their operating licenses, typically at
times when large capital expenditures would be required to re-
place key components such as steam generators or to correct sig-
nificant deficiencies in safety-related systems.233 Third, plants
which are kept open will be operated to achieve higher capacity
factors and lower costs per unit of generation. 234 Fourth, owner-
ship and/or management of the remaining operating plants will be
consolidated among a comparatively small number of companies
specializing in that role.235
2. Political Implications
Electricity deregulation has also created significant political
pressures to change public policies relating to nuclear power.236
Competition among generators, even prospectively, has engen-
dered strong political pressures for policy-makers to establish and
maintain a "level playing field" among the alternative sources of
electric generation in terms of the regulations imposed and subsi-
dies provided by government. 237
232. See id.
233. See id. See also Marsha Burton & Lynne Olver, Can Nuclear Power Survive
Deregulation? The Jury is Still Out, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1998, at R21.
234. See Reynolds & Draper, supra note 228.
235. See Burton & Olver, supra note 233; Reynolds & Draper, supra note 228.
236. See NRC Final Policy Statement, supra note 226; See also TOMAIN, supra note
226, at 103-34.
237. See, e.g., Workshop on the Effects of Competition on Fuel Use and Types of Fuel
Generation Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 105th Congress
(1997) (remarks by Samuel K. Skinner, President, Commonwealth Edison Co.), avail-
able at 1997 WL 10570918:
[I]t is critical that Congress and the administration take the deliberate
steps necessary to achieve the goal of removing barriers to competition
within your traditional jurisdiction. While I am realistic enough to be-
lieve that no business is on a truly "level playing field," this must be the
ideal.... The federal government must acknowledge its obligation to be-
gin taking used nuclear fuel in 1998 to a central, interim storage facility -
- - and get on with it.... I cannot overemphasize the need for passage of
legislation this year to reform the government's nuclear waste manage-
ment program.... [T]his nation cannot continue to avoid dealing with the
issues of nuclear waste disposal, nor can it afford to block further use of
nuclear energy simply because of that inaction. I also want to note that
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The commitment by the federal government since enactment
of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 to protect public health and the
environment from the risks of nuclear power has resulted in sig-
nificant regulation of nuclear generators. On the other hand, the
long-standing federal commitment to promote the development of
commercial nuclear power has also resulted in significant subsi-
dies to nuclear generators. 238 The transition from regulatory to
market pricing and the escalation of competition will thus result
in significant political pressures to reduce both government subsi-
dies to and government regulation of nuclear power. 239
These political pressures will focus on a number of public pol-
icy issues of significance to the future of commercial nuclear
power. First, there is the issue of the recovery of so-called
"stranded costs" 240 associated with closure of plants prior to the
expiration of their operating licenses. Second, the responsibility
for the costs of decommissioning plants constructed under tradi-
tional regulation but closed after deregulation is quite significant.
Third, the stringency of public health and safety standards and
the methods used by the NRC to set and enforce those standards
have become a focus of concern for the industry and its critics.
Fourth, the continuation of the accident liability limitations cur-
most of the uncertainties about the cost estimates for future cleanup of
nuclear plant sites stem from uncertainties related to waste disposal ---
where it will go - - - and how much it will cost .... We are not seeking any
special preferences as a result of restructuring. However, we believe
there are actions, which we have discussed in this testimony, that the
federal government should consider to ensure that the benefits of nuclear
energy continue....
Id.
238. See Meek, supra note 74, at 393-4. Nuclear power is not alone in securing
public policy-derived subsidies, of course. For example, environmental groups, pollu-
tion regulators, and nuclear and gas generators have been particularly concerned dur-
ing the restructuring debate about the significant subsidy which results from
unregulated air emissions from coal generators. See, e.g., Rudy Perkins, Electricity
Deregulation, Environmental Externalities and the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 993, 1032-34 (1998).
239. See Reynolds & Draper, supra note 228; TOMAIN, supra note 226, at 161-72.
240. "Stranded costs" refer to the previously incurred costs of a utility which would
be recoverable in prices charged by a monopoly under traditional cost-of-service regu-
lation but would not be recoverable in the prices set by a competitive market. The
types of costs that may become stranded fall into three major categories: (1) the costs
of generating facilities built in the past which were a lot more expensive to construct
and operate than plants currently being constructed; (2) the costs of purchased power
and/or fuel supply contracts executed in the past with significantly higher prices than
those being negotiated today; and (3) the remaining balances of regulatory assets set
up by regulators to defer to the future recovery of costs incurred in the past. See Fox-
PENNER, supra note 224, at 385-86.
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rently imposed by the Price-Anderson Act is a looming
controversy.
But, perhaps the most significant public policy issue for the
future of commercial nuclear power in the United States is high-
level nuclear waste policy. According to a spokesman for the Nu-
clear Energy Institute, the principal legislative and regulatory af-
fairs representative for the nuclear utilities, "'We're well
positioned economically to make the move to a competitive mar-
ket. The only problem we have is waste disposal."' 241 According to
the Vice President of Nuclear Operations for Northern States
Power Company, one of the leading nuclear utilities, the high-
level waste issue could prove to be the "Achilles heel" of commer-
cial nuclear power.242
VI. Implications of Electric Industry Restructuring for
High-Level Nuclear Waste Policy
A. Effects on Nuclear Waste Generation
Electric utility industry restructuring is expected to have a
significant role in determining how many U.S. nuclear plants will
operate for how long at what capacity factor. The number of oper-
ating plants, the lengths of their remaining operating lives, and
their capacity factors during their remaining operating lives will
all be variables that affect the volume of spent nuclear fuel dis-
charged by American nuclear utilities. While the Department of
Energy prepares periodic forecasts of the volumes of spent fuel to
be discharged in the future, it has not attempted to assess the ef-
fects of competition and deregulation in the electric utility indus-
try. Indeed, until recently, it has used the simplifying assumption
that, absent announced plans to close a particular reactor, operat-
ing plants would continue to operate for the balance of their li-
cense periods (i.e., forty years).24 3 In effect, this "reference case"
assumes that the number and duration of operating life exten-
sions will more or less offset the number and length of nuclear
plant early retirements, whatever the cause. Under this assump-
tion, DOE's January, 1998 projection of the total volume of spent
fuel to be discharged by 2035 when the last existing commercial
reactor completes its licensed operating life was approximately
241. Burton & Olver, supra note 233.
242. See id.
243. See SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 24, at 4.1.
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87,000 MTU. 244 In its 1998 projection, however, DOE also in-
cluded a forecast based on the assumption that existing plants
would complete only 30 years of their licensed operating lives.
Under this assumption, DOE forecast that cumulative volumes of
spent fuel discharged would peak at approximately 69,000 MTU
in 2025.245 To date, no independent analysis of the effects of elec-
tric utility industry restructuring on the future levels of spent fuel
discharges has been reported.
B. Effects on Nuclear Waste Program Funding
The number of nuclear plants operating for how long at what
capacity factor will also affect the level of nuclear waste program
funding. This is because the NWPA funding formula is one mill
per kwh of electricity actually generated and sold by operating nu-
clear plants. Closed plants generating and selling no electricity
also pay no fees to the Nuclear Waste Fund. As a result, the dis-
aggregation of the electric utility industry and the deregulation of
electricity generation and marketing could potentially have a sig-
nificant effect on Nuclear Waste Fund revenues.
However, the DOE has included no analysis of the likely ef-
fects of electric industry restructuring and deregulation in its pe-
riodic Nuclear Waste Fund Fee Adequacy Assessments. The most
recent Fee Adequacy Assessment was published in December
1998, in conjunction with the Yucca Mountain Repository Viabil-
ity Assessment. 246 In this report, DOE did assess the projected
effect on fee adequacy of an increase in program costs of twenty
percent above "reference case" estimates. 247 The agency also
presented a sensitivity case showing the effect of assuming "refer-
ence case" cost estimates but interest rates fifteen percent lower
and inflation rates fifteen percent higher than the reference
case.248 However, even though it expressly acknowledged that,
"fee income projections may vary with either early reactor shut-
downs before license expiration, or by service life extensions," the
1998 DOE report did not analyze any such effects. 249 Notably, the
1998 Fee Adequacy Report included no projection of Nuclear
244. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 1997 9 (1998).
245. See id. at tbl.
246. See OFF. OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Nu-
CLEAR WASTE FUND FEE ADEQUACY: AN ASSESSMENT (1998).
247. See id. at 17-21.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 21.
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Waste Fund revenues using the thirty year operating life assump-
tion for existing reactors included as a "sensitivity case" in the De-
partment's January, 1998 projection of spent fuel volumes. 250
An independent analysis prepared at the same time as the
most recent DOE Fee Adequacy Assessment for the author and
two public interest groups by an independent consultant, Synapse
Energy Economics (Synapse), suggests that the effect of electric
industry restructuring on Nuclear Waste Fund revenues could be
significant. 251 In a report released in January 1999, Synapse
economists Bruce Biewald and David White modeled the effects of
electric industry restructuring on nuclear plant retirements and
then evaluated the effects on Nuclear Waste Fee revenues of three
different retirement scenarios. In their reference case, the Syn-
apse economists predicted that thirty-four existing nuclear plants
would be retired early, with a resulting loss of 479 gigawatt years
of nuclear capacity compared to the DOE "reference case." In
their high nuclear generation case, Biewald and White projected
that only twenty reactors would close early, reducing the loss of
nuclear capacity to 283 gigawatt years. But, in their low nuclear
generation case, the consultants estimated that ninety reactors
would be retired prior to the expiration of their operating licenses
with a resulting loss in nuclear capacity compared to the DOE ref-
erence case of 1386 gigawatt years. 252
To put these figures in perspective, current nuclear capacity
is approximately 100 gigawatts. So, the loss of 1386 gigawatt
years of capacity projected in the Synapse low generation case is
equivalent to losing almost fourteen years of generation from the
entire existing nuclear industry, or to retiring all its existing
plants after an average operating life of roughly twenty-six years.
By comparison, the Synapse reference case projects a loss of nu-
clear generation due to restructuring equivalent to approximately
five years of operation of the entire nuclear industry, or that all
existing units retire after an average operating life of approxi-
mately thirty-five years. To date, no nuclear plant has operated
for its entire forty year operating life. Of twenty-two plants re-
tired to date, only two operated for more than thirty years - Big
Rock Point for thirty-four years and Yankee Rowe for thirty-one
250. See id. at 17-21.
251. See BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199.
252. See id. at 8-10, tbl. 2.3.
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years. 253 Of the 106 plants still operating at the end of 1998, none
had yet completed thirty years of operation. 254
DOE has assessed Nuclear Waste Fee adequacy on the basis
of whether the Nuclear Waste Fund would have a balance in 2042
of $2.5 billion or more in constant 1998 dollars. 255 Biewald and
White have calculated that in both their reference and low nuclear
generation scenarios, the 1.0 mill/kwh Nuclear Waste Fee will be
inadequate to meet the commercial share of program costs. Spe-
cifically, they project that, to remain adequate, the fee would have
to be increased beginning in 1999 to 1.2 mills/kwh (i.e. twenty per-
cent increase) in their reference case and 1.5 mills/kwh (fifty per-
cent increase) in their low generation case. 256 Biewald and White
also assessed the combined effects on fee adequacy of restructur-
ing-driven early plant retirements and the fifty percent increase
in waste program costs recently projected by independent consul-
tants retained by the State of Nevada. 257 In these two scenarios,
the fee would have to be increased to 2.9 mills/kwh (i.e. a 190%
increase) in the reference case and to 4.5 mills/kwh (a 350% in-
crease) in the low generation case. 258 Biewald and White charac-
terized the magnitude of the funding shortfalls that would result
in these scenarios if the fee remained at its current level as "huge"
and "a gross violation of the [NWPAI principle that the costs of the
program are to be recovered from the generators of the waste in
the fee charged to nuclear generation." 259
Potentially even more significant, Biewald and White con-
cluded that, as the Nuclear Waste Fee is increased to offset the
effects of restructuring-driven revenue increases and program-re-
lated cost increases, "there is an important and troubling feedback
effect upon fee adequacy."260 In particular, "[a] higher fee will
tend to cause additional nuclear unit retirements, which in turn
253. See id. at 3, tbl. 2.1.
254. Compare BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199 at 3, tbl. 2.1, with SPENT FUEL
STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 24, at tbl. A-1.
255. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
NUCLEAR WASTE FUND FEE ADEQUACY: AN ASSESSMENT 17-18 (1998).
256. See BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199, at 19.
257. See INDEP. COST ASSESSMENT, supra note 30. This assessment projects total
"to go" program costs of $53.9 billion in constant 1996 dollars. At the time of this
assessment, the most recent DOE estimate projected NWF resources to meet these
costs (current NWF balance plus future revenues) to be $28.1 billion, or approxi-
mately fifty-two percent of the Nevada consultants' "to go" cost estimate. See id.
258. See BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199, at 19.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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will lead to a need to increase the fee. It is quite possible that in
some scenarios this reinforcing feedback could result in a situa-
tion where increasing the fee is counterproductive. '26 1 For exam-
ple, even assuming DOE's program cost projections; the Biewald
and White analysis predicts that restructuring-driven plant clo-
sures would increase the cost of nuclear generation by 0.2 to 0.5
mills/kwh. Other things being equal, this comparatively small in-
crease is enough to cause some number (presumably quite small)
of previously marginal plants to become uneconomic to operate in
a competitive market environment. But, combining both restruc-
turing-driven plant retirements with a program-related cost in-
crease on the order of magnitude of that projected by the State of
Nevada's consultants, this "feedback effect" becomes much more
significant. The Biewald and White analysis would show this sce-
nario producing an initial increase in the cost of nuclear power of
1.9 to 3.5 mills/kwh. Using their reference case increase of 1.9
mills/kwh, Biewald and White then projected that the "feedback
effect" from this initial price increase would result in a second
round of an additional ten nuclear plant retirements, increasing
the total early retirements to forty-four units and 654 gigawatt-
years of generation. 262 Of course, this second generation of "feed-
back effects" would possibly result in another round of early plant
retirements and generation losses. 263
C. Effects to Date on Nuclear Waste Policy
Since the enactment of the NWPA in 1982, a fundamental
premise of United States nuclear waste policy has been that "the
costs of disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste [are] to be borne by the parties responsible for its genera-
tion."264 For the producers of commercial nuclear power, this pol-
icy has been implemented through a one mill charge on each
kilowatt/hour of nuclear energy generated and sold. However,
electric utility industry restructuring manifestly has the potential
to threaten both the validity of this fundamental policy premise
and the efficacy of its existing financing mechanism. This threat
is particularly acute if the costs of DOE's overall waste program
increase significantly beyond current official estimates. Such a re-
261. Id.
262. See id. at 19-20.
263. See BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199, at 19-20.
264. OFFICE OF CILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AN-
NuAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 1997 69 (1998).
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sult was recently predicted in an independent study prepared by
consultants retained by the State of Nevada.
Biewald and White have recommended an immediate in-
crease in the Nuclear Waste Fee as the appropriate policy re-
sponse to this clear and present danger to the financial integrity of
DOE's nuclear waste program.265 The State of Nevada has called
for abandonment of the principal programmatic premises of cur-
rent policy, particularly the licensing and construction of the
Yucca Mountain repository and permanent emplacement there of
both commercial spent fuel and defense high-level wastes. 266 The
nuclear utilities have strenuously resisted both these policy pre-
scriptions, vociferously opposing any increase in the Nuclear
Waste Fee and aggressively attributing any Yucca Mountain pro-
gram delays and cost overruns to DOE incompetence and ineffi-
ciency. 267 Instead, the Nuclear Energy Institute and its members
have pursued a dual strategy. First, they have pushed Congress
very hard for a bill to authorize an interim storage facility at the
Nevada Test Site and the necessary transportation program to
move spent fuel there from reactor sites.268 Second, the nuclear
utilities and their allies have repeatedly petitioned the federal
courts for a ruling that, under current law, DOE must immedi-
ately accept logistical and financial responsibility for the wastes
and their relocation. 269 To date, DOE's policy prescription has
been to stay the course with a permanent repository at Yucca
Mountain, interim storage at reactor sites, and maintenance of
the Nuclear Waste Fee at one mill.270
Through this writing, Congress has enacted no new amend-
ments to the NWPA to address the developing crisis in nuclear
waste program financing. The bills which have passed in either
the House or the Senate have essentially ignored the long-term
financing issue, while making sure that the Nuclear Waste Fee is
not increased in the near-term in response to cash flow pressures.
Such pressures are projected to result from simultaneous con-
265. See BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199, at 19.
266. See NEVADA AGENCY FOR NUCLEAR PROJECTS, STATE OF NEVADA OVERSIGHT OF
THE U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY'S HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROGRAM 1-17 (1997).
267. See Schuler, supra note 185, at 34-35.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See id. See also Hearings on S. 608 Before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, 106th Congress (1999) (March 24, 1999 Statement of Lake H.
Barrett, Acting Director, Off. of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of
Energy).
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struction of the Yucca Mountain repository and the Nevada Test
Site interim storage facility as well initiation of a large-scale
waste transportation program.27 1 The D. C. Circuit told DOE that
it had an unconditional obligation to accept spent fuel beginning
January 31, 1998, but has thus far declined to mandate the
agency to take any particular action to fulfill that obligation.272
Instead, the court has directed the nuclear utilities to pursue the
remedies available to them under their Standard Fuel Contracts.
At this point, it does appear that DOE will have financial as well
as logistical responsibility for interim storage of spent fuel after
January 31, 1998.273 However, it is not at all clear whether the
Department will be able to use the Nuclear Waste Fund to pay
that obligation or will have to pay it from the Department of Jus-
tice's litigation contingency fund or with a separate appropria-
tion.274 Thus far, the Supreme Court has shown no inclination to
become involved. 275 Energy Secretary Richardson and several of
the nuclear utilities have discussed a compromise in which at-re-
actor storage would continue until a permanent repository became
available, with DOE contracting with the nuclear utilities (or
their agents) to manage the at-reactor sites.276 Apparently, this
proposal would be designed to resolve both the Congressional im-
passe over legislation and the remedy for the D.C. Circuit/Court of
Claims litigation over DOE's breach of the Standard Fuel Con-
tracts. At this writing, however, the source of funding and other
key elements of such a compromise were unclear and its prospects
uncertain.
In sum, the restructuring of the electric utility industry now
in progress has compounded the pre-existing complexities and ex-
acerbated the prior controversies associated with the financing of
271. For example, S. 608 as introduced in the 1999 session provided for some flexi-
bility in the annual level of the fee during construction of the Yucca Mountain reposi-
tory, but required that the fee average 1.0 mill during construction and not exceed 1.0
mills after construction. See Murkowski Introduces Nuclear Waste Bill, S. 608, Nu-
CLEAR WASTE NEWS, March 18, 1999, available at 1999 WL 10308951.
272. See Northern States Power, 128 F.3d at 761, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1016 (1998);
see also Bauser, supra note 172, at 392-93.
273. See Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 582 (1998).
274. Compare Yankee Atomic Electric Co., 42 Fed. Cl. at 223, with Northern States
Power, 43 Fed. Cl. at 374. See Gary Putka, Court Rules US. Energy Dep't Broke Vow
to Rid Plants of Nuclear Fuel, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1998, at A14; Utility Must Pursue
Contract Remedy for DOE Failure to Take Waste, Court Rules, DAILY ENV. REP.
(BNA), Apr. 12, 1999, at A-2.
275. See Northern States Power, 525 U.S. 1016.
276. See Joby Warrick, U.S. to Offer Nuclear Waste Plan, WASH. POST, Feb. 25,
1999, at A2.
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the interim storage and ultimate disposition of spent nuclear fuel
and other high level radioactive waste generated by commercial
nuclear power plants. As a result, there is presently no political
consensus regarding the public policy necessary and appropriate
to address what is definitely an impending financial crisis.
VII. Policy Recommendations
The current national policy for isolation of spent nuclear fuel
from the environment has been premised since 1987 on the suc-
cessful development of a Yucca Mountain repository which would
be operational by 1998 and could be characterized, designated, li-
censed, constructed, operated, and closed for a total cost less than
or equal to the revenues raised by a Nuclear Waste Fee of one mill
per kilowatt-hour imposed on the electricity generated and sold by
the country's nuclear plants. The adequacy of the Nuclear Waste
Fee has, in turn, been based on the assumptions that (1) most, if
not all commercial nuclear reactors would generate electricity at
comparatively high capacity factors during their licensed period of
operation, namely 40 years, and (2) the cost of transporting spent
fuel from reactors and isolating it forever at Yucca Mountain
would be recoverable through the rates of electric utilities which
were regulated monopolies holding exclusive franchises to provide
electricity within their service territories.
But, in 1999, the site of the proposed Yucca Mountain reposi-
tory has yet to be completely characterized, let alone designated,
licensed or constructed. Indeed, there are significant unresolved
uncertainties with regard to whether the Yucca Mountain site is
suitable for a repository. Moreover, even assuming it will be con-
structed, a Yucca Mountain repository could not be operational
before 2010 and former Secretary of Energy O'Leary told Congress
that 2015 was its likely in-service date. Recent studies conducted
on behalf of the State of Nevada also raise serious questions re-
garding whether the repository's total system life-cycle costs will
substantially exceed even the most optimistic projections of Nu-
clear Waste Fee revenues. Moreover, the structural disaggrega-
tion of the electric utility industry and the introduction of
competition and deregulation into its generation sector make it
very unlikely that most commercial nuclear plants will operate for
40 years or that spent fuel isolation costs will continue to be recov-
erable through the rates of regulated monopolies. Indeed, the
Biewald and White study suggests that the introduction of compe-
tition and deregulation for generators of electricity could precipi-
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tate a shortfall in Nuclear Waste Fund financing of as much as
$46.5 billion. 277
As a result, current national policy for the isolation of spent
nuclear fuel clearly faces an impending financing crisis occasioned
by the virtually certain conjunction of rising costs and falling rev-
enues. To resolve this crisis, American policy-makers will need to
redefine the Nuclear Waste Fund and reconfigure its financing to
take into account both the unresolved uncertainties in the nation's
strategy for isolating spent fuel from the environment and the
pending changes in the structure and regulation of the electric
utility industry. The balance of this article will address this re-
definition and reconfiguration.
A. The Nuclear Waste Policy-Making Environment
There are three critical characteristics of the decision-making
environment for commercial nuclear waste policy, including espe-
cially but not exclusively its financing. First, the environment is
much more political than it is technical. Second, the technical is-
sues are extremely complex and highly controversial, even among
experts in the scientific disciplines involved. Third, from both a
technical and political perspective, there really is no precedent or
analogy to follow: the policy-making problem associated with the
discharge and isolation of spent nuclear fuel really is "a new spe-
cies of trouble" because the 250,000-year time frame for the tech-
nical issues which are posed simply dwarfs the whole length of
human history, let alone the major challenges of the past con-
fronted by the Anglo-American political system such as protracted
wars and depressions. 278 Indeed, the planning horizon for the
high-level nuclear waste problem is more than 1,000 times longer
than the entire history of the United States as a nation.
As a result, a policy that is technically "right" for the ages also
must be politically "correct" for the moment. Or, as noted sociolo-
gist Kai Erickson has observed about the high-level nuclear waste
policy-making process generally:
[H]uman decisions do not always emerge from reflective coun-
sels in which facts are arrayed in order and logic is the prevail-
ing currency of thought. They emerge from complex fields of
277. See BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199, at 17, tbl. 4.1.
278. See KAI ERICKSON, A NEW SPECIES OF TROUBLE 203 (1994).
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force, in which the vanities of leaders and the moods of constitu-
encies and the inertias of bureaucracies play a critical part. 2 7 9
This decision-making process has also been characterized in a
more generic context as "muddling through."280 This approach
posits a decision-making process which makes periodic, incremen-
tal adjustments at the margins of past policies to respond to new
problems posed by the policy environment. As both Erickson and
Kristin Shrader-Frechette have pointed out, this approach to pol-
icy "is uncomfortably like that of the famous drunk who looks for a
missing set of keys under a streetlight not because he has any rea-
son to think he lost them there but because it is the only light
available." 281 But, "muddle through" is the approach which com-
plex organizations typically adopt when confronted with large, dif-
ficult problems with expensive but uncertain and controversial
solutions. Generally, this "muddle through" approach is the best
such organizations can manage, whether or not it results in "good"
policy in terms of the goals to which it is purportedly directed.28 2
B. The Political Constraints of the Moment
The technically correct policy for the ages must be developed
within several significant constraints currently imposed by the
correct politics of the moment:
1. While official national policy remains committed to its con-
struction, the Yucca Mountain repository (and, with it, the entire
premise of the NWPAA that "permanent" geologic emplacement at
the Yucca Mountain site is the "solution" to the high-level waste
problem) is clearly in jeopardy due to scientific uncertainties,
schedule delays and projected cost overruns. Indeed, enthusiasm
of the nuclear utilities themselves for Yucca Mountain would
evaporate if they were to remain entirely responsible for its costs
and it became clear those costs would escalate to an extent even
approaching the fifty percent predicted by the State of Nevada's
consultants.
279. Id. at 202.
280. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," PUBLIC ADMIN.
REV. (1959) at 79, reprinted in PUB. POLICY: THE ESSENTIAL READINGS 113 (Stella The-
odoulou & Matthew Lan. eds., Prentice Hall 1995).
281. ERICKSON, supra note 278, at 211 (citing Kristin Schrader-Frechette, Expert
Judgment in Assessing Rad-waste Risks: What Nevadans Should Know About Yucca
Mountain 154 (1992) (unpublished study submitted to the Nuclear Waste Project Of-
fice, State of Nevada)).
282. See Lindblom, supra note 280, at 80, 83-84.
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2. Backed by the credible threat of a sustainable Presidential
veto, the Clinton Administration has adamantly and successfully
rejected industry-backed proposals for a central interim storage
facility at the Nevada Test Site until the future of the Yucca
Mountain repository is assured. The nuclear utilities' continued
pursuit under current law of a license for a privately-owned and -
operated ISFSI at Skull Valley suggests that they harbor doubts
about the prospects of the new legislation that would be required
to authorize the Nevada Test Site as a government-owned and op-
erated storage facility, even if Yucca Mountain proves non-viable.
Certainly, the State of Nevada is going to be no less hostile to such
a facility than it has been to a repository.
3. The development of above-ground dry cask technology as
an alternative to underwater pools has made at- or near-reactor
storage of spent fuel a viable technical option for periods of up to
100 years. As a result, at- or near-reactor storage in dry casks has
become the de facto interim storage policy in the United States.28 3
4. The structural disaggregation of the electric utility indus-
try and the introduction of competitive markets and deregulation
in its generation sector have created significant uncertainty re-
garding the sufficiency of the future revenue stream produced by
the Nuclear Waste Fee to finance the total system, life-cycle costs
of the Yucca Mountain repository and its supporting subsystems,
let alone the additional costs of a central interim storage facility.
This potential revenue shortfall is particularly problematic if cost
overruns materialize at the levels projected by the State of Ne-
vada's consultants. However, the obvious response to this prob-
lem of an increase in the Nuclear Waste Fee would seemingly be
both economically self-defeating and politically self-destructing.
C. The Politically Correct Policy for the Current Political
Moment
The policy outcome to be expected from the current political
moment will necessarily be consistent with the limiting con-
straints of the political moment. This outcome will thus involve
waste isolation facilities that can be constructed and operated for
the foreseeable future with the revenues projected to be realized
from the existing fee of one mill ($0.001) per kwh of nuclear power
generated and sold. This outcome is likely to combine near-term
283. See generally Denise Renee Foster, Comment, Utilities: De Facto Repositories
for High-Level Radioactive Waste? 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 375 (1996).
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storage in at-reactor dry cask facilities operated by nuclear utili-
ties with short-term financing provided by the Nuclear Waste
Fund. In other words, the most likely policy outcome from the
current political moment, de facto or de jure, is some variation of
the Richardson Plan, deferring the issues of both long-term waste
isolation and its financing to the indefinite future.
D. The Politically Correct Policy: Foreseeable Risks
There are significant risks associated with the predicted pol-
icy outcome, of course.
1. The Risk of Deferring Waste Management Problems to
Future Generations
Federal policy has avowedly been to assure that the problem
of establishing "waste management program will not be deferred
to future generations." 28 4 By contrast, the predicted approach
means that the problem will have to revisited by each generation,
for generations to come. But, as Kai Erickson has so eloquently
explained:
We cannot promise our own children-never mind those who fol-
low hundreds of thousands of years hence-that they will be safe
from the wastes. And so long as that is so, we are not taking the
problem out of their hands so much as we are taking the solu-
tion out of their hands. 28 5
So, deferring the waste isolation problem to future generations is
really a foregone conclusion. The only real issue is not whether
the problem is deferred, but whether the means, especially the fi-
nancial wherewithal, to address the problem is denied to future
generations.
2. The Risk of Wishful Thinking Regarding Waste
Isolation Costs
There is also the risk that policymakers will fool themselves
into believing that the nation can afford a particular waste isola-
tion "solution" when the available resources are actually inade-
quate to pay for it. This certainly seems to be a real risk with the
Yucca Mountain repository at the present time, and has been a
chronic problem in the past with nuclear facilities of all types.
284. Presidential Message, supra note 91, at 227.
285. ERICKSON, supra note 278, at 225 (emphasis in original).
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Moreover, should Yucca Mountain not prove viable as a "solution"
(as now seems likely), there would necessarily be costs (currently
unknown, but certainly large) associated with the alternative
(currently uncertain, but probably continued reliance on at-reac-
tor dry cask storage at least until well into the twenty-first cen-
tury). This risk can be addressed only by the availability of
incremental resources should the need arise.
3. The Risk of Inadequate Near-Term Financing
Then, there is the risk that the available resources are insuffi-
cient for an adequate temporary solution, either because "muddle
through" is an inappropriate response to the nuclear waste prob-
lem or because we have failed to allocate available resources in
proportion to its significance to the protection of human health
and the environment. "Muddle through" poses a particular con-
cern here because monitoring and maintenance of dry cask stor-
age sites will be required at approximately seventy nuclear plant
sites where the generating facilities are presumed to be closing,
raising the issue of transfer of institutional control, especially as
the period of time after plant closure increases. Even though the
storage sites themselves are decentralized, centralized institu-
tional system for storage site monitoring and maintenance would
certainly be feasible. 28 6 But, such a system would require ade-
quate financial resources to pay for the best monitoring and main-
tenance practices at the decentralized sites and to assure that the
sites continue to meet established and evolving performance
benchmarks.
4. The Risk of Inadequate Long-Term Financing
Finally, there is the risk that the resources available may be
sufficient for an adequate temporary solution, but not for an indef-
inite solution. This is a particular issue because the waste is ex-
pected to require isolation from the environment for up to 250,000
years into the future, yet the Nuclear Waste Fee is expected to
generate revenues for only approximately forty years into the
future.
286. Indeed, the existence of multiple sites provides the opportunity for perform-
ance "benchmarking" and development of "best practices" among competing vendors
of monitoring and maintenance services. Certainly, the history of DOE management
of other nuclear wastes provides no basis for the belief that one, huge central storage
site out of the public eye in the Nevada or Utah desert would be better monitored and
maintained than seventy much smaller sites more subject to public scrutiny.
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E. The Politically Correct Policy: Necessary Refinements
The enumerated risks associated with the expected policy out-
come from the current political environment are real and substan-
tial. Patently, these risks will require important refinements to
be made in the expected policy outcome.
1. Several Key Assumptions of the Waste Isolation Program
Concept DOE Used to Assess the Adequacy of the Nuclear
Waste Fund Should Be Redefined.
The DOE has conducted its most recent assessment of the ad-
equacy of the Nuclear Waste Fee on the basis of its projections of
the "total system life-cycle" costs of the Yucca Mountain repository
and its supporting waste acceptance and transportation program
assuming the repository is completed in 2010 and decommissioned
in 2116.287 Moreover, the DOE assessment assumes that Yucca
Mountain will be the one and only repository, with no interim
storage.288 The DOE assumes that the total estimated costs for
this program, in constant 1998 dollars, will be $37.0 billion.2 9
The DOE projects that the Nuclear Waste Fee will generate future
revenues, in constant 1998 dollars, of $23.2 billion on the assump-
tion that currently open nuclear plants "will operate for forty
years from the issuance of their operating licenses without exten-
sions, and reactor performance will not be affected by aging. '290
These assumptions need to be redefined in at least three key re-
spects to provide an appropriate assessment of Nuclear Waste
Fund adequacy.
a. The DOE assessment should assume interim storage until
at least 2025 and perhaps indefinitely.
The Yucca Mountain repository has not yet been proven to be
viable as a method of "permanent" and "safe" isolation of spent
nuclear fuel and there are increasing doubts that it ever will.
Moreover, in the absence of both a repository and a central in-
terim storage facility, at-reactor, dry cask storage is the only rea-
sonable temporary storage alternative. Thus, the "conservative"
approach to the financing of spent fuel isolation would be to as-
sume that the Yucca Mountain repository will prove to be unsuita-
287. See OFFICE OF CILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., DEP'T OF ENERGY, Nu-
CLEAR WASTE FUND FEE ADEQUACY: AN ASSESSMENT 1-3 (1998).
288. See id. at 9.
289. See id.
290. Id. at 12-13.
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ble and the spent fuel will remain in at-reactor, dry cask storage
while alternatives to Yucca Mountain are pursued.
This is the approach which was taken by the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission in its 1990 Waste Confidence Decision Review:
"In order to obtain a conservative upper bound for the timing of
repository availability, the Commission has made the assumption
that the Yucca Mountain site will be found to be unsuitable."291
Because the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments require
DOE to consider alternatives to Yucca Mountain only after that
site has been determined unsuitable and the Department had pro-
jected a twenty-five year period from initiation of characterization
to acceptance of waste at an alternative repository site, the NRC
concluded that it would be "reasonable to expect that a repository
would be available by the year 2025" if Yucca Mountain was deter-
mined unsuitable in the year 2000.292 In this connection, the NRC
reasoned:
Geologic disposal of high-level radioactive wastes is an unprece-
dented endeavor. It requires reliable projections of the waste
isolation performance of natural and engineered barriers over
millennia. After the repository is sealed, retrieval of the em-
placed wastes will no longer be practicable, and the commitment
of wastes to that site will, by design, be irreversible .... [Tihe
Commission believes that the confidence of both NRC and the
public depends less on meeting the schedule for repository oper-
ation than on meeting safety requirements and doing the job
right the first time. Thus, given the Commission's assurance
that spent fuel can safely be stored for at least 100 years if neces-
sary, it appears prudent for all concerned to prepare for the bet-
ter-understood and more manageable problems of storage for a
few more years in order to provide additional time to assure the
success of permanent geologic disposal.2 9 3
Thus, according to the NRC in 1990, the "conservative" approach
to financing assumptions would entail no repository until 2025
and on-site, dry cask storage in the interim.
In its 1990 Waste Confidence Decision Review, the NRC com-
mitted to perform another review in 1999.294 But, the NRC has
deferred this review. As a result, there is no way to know with
291. Waste Confidence Decision, supra note 116, at 38,505.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 38,507 (emphasis added).
294. See id. at 38,505-06.
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certainty what the NRC would consider to be the "conservative"
set of assumptions for waste isolation at this juncture. However,
it would appear reasonable to conclude that the NRC would be no
less "conservative" in 1999 than it had been in 1990 and assume
no repository any earlier than 2025, with on-site, dry cask storage
in the interim. Moreover, the results to date of the litigation be-
tween the nuclear utilities and DOE over financial and logistical
responsibility for waste acceptance and storage strongly suggest
that the "conservative" assumption is that DOE will, at the very
least, have to bear the cost of at-reactor storage after January 31,
1998. In fact, former Energy Secretary James Schlesinger antici-
pated such an eventuality when, on the eve of leaving office in
December, 1992, he proposed that Congress authorize the use of
Nuclear Waste Fund monies to construct at-reactor dry cask stor-
age facilities. 295
Given the uncertainties regarding "permanent geologic dispo-
sal" which have emerged from the Yucca Mountain characteriza-
tion, the 1990 NRC assumption that an alternative site suitable
for a geologic repository capable of "permanent" isolation of spent
fuel would be operational in 2025 may no longer be "conservative."
Indeed, former NRC Chairman John Ahearne has recommended
abandoning the repository effort and switching to a waste isola-
tion strategy based on above-ground storage facilities which could
be sited regardless of geologic conditions. 296 As a result, the truly
"conservative" assumption is that an alternative repository site is
no more likely to be determined suitable for "permanent disposal"
than the initial site.
In light of these considerations, the waste isolation concept
used to assess the adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund should be
redefined to reflect at-reactor, dry cask storage continuing indefi-
nitely (including periodic repackaging of spent fuel assemblies
and replacement of casks) to cover the contingency that neither
Yucca Mountain nor any alternative site will prove viable as a ge-
ologic repository capable of "permanent" waste isolation.
295. See JAmEs FLYNN ET AL., ONE HUNDRED CENTURIES OF SOLITUDE: REDIRECTING
AMERICA'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY 29 (1995).
296. See id.
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b. If it does not assume that at-reactor, dry cask storage will
continue indefinitely, then the DOE assessment should
assume that the emplacement of waste at the Yucca
Mountain repository will be "monitored and retrievable"
rather than "permanent."
A recent review by a prestigious group of academics and con-
sultants of the nation's continuing commitment to the Yucca
Mountain repository as a "permanent" solution to the problem of
high-level nuclear waste (HLNW) isolation concluded:
Yucca Mountain very well could be unacceptable on any terms.
There are no alternative plans, only the directions in the Nu-
clear Waste Policy Act to return to Congress for further instruc-
tions if Yucca Mountain is unsuitable. If Yucca Mountain is
found to be unsuitable in 30, 40, 50 or 100 years, because no
genuine site study was conducted, what options will exist? The
nuclear power plants that produce the money for the HLNW
program will have long been closed, and they no longer will be a
source of funding. The Nuclear Waste Fund will have been
spent. Loading Yucca Mountain with HLNW as if it were a re-
pository, especially on compromised standards, and then finding
that Yucca Mountain is unsuitable or that some other option for
HLNW management is necessary, will place tremendous bur-
dens on future generations, complicating rather than simplify-
ing their abilities to manage the legacy of HLNW. 2 9 7
Moreover, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission currently requires
that any repository be designed to allow the retrieval of waste at
any time up to fifty years after waste operations begin.298 Given
both the empirical uncertainties regarding Yucca Mountain and
the requirements of NRC regulations, "DOE is designing the re-
pository so that it could (with Nuclear Regulatory Commission ap-
proval) be either closed as early as 10 years after emplacement of
the last waste package, or kept open for hundreds of years from
the start of waste emplacement."299 Moreover, DOE is assuming
that "[r]etrieval of waste, if needed, would follow, in reverse order,
the same steps taken in emplacing the waste."300 DOE has made
no provision in its assessment of Nuclear Waste Fund adequacy
297. Id. at 110.
298. See 10 C.F.R. § 60.111(b) (1998).
299. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, VIA-
BILITY ASSESSMENT OF A YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY: OVERVIEW § 3.2 (1998), availa-
ble at http://domino.ymp.gov/va/va.nsf.
300. Id.
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for the costs of waste retrieval and isolation following retrieval.
Indeed, DOE has not even estimated these costs. Instead, the
DOE assessment simply assumes these costs will not be incurred
because the waste will remain emplaced and the repository will be
permanently closed and its costs will terminate in 2116.301
This assumption is clearly not "conservative" for purposes of
assessing Nuclear Waste Fund adequacy. If the Yucca Mountain
repository must be designed for the contingency that emplaced
waste will have to be retrieved, then funding should also be as-
sured to cover the costs of that contingency.
c. The DOE assessment should assume that future revenues to
be realized by the Nuclear Waste Fee will be reduced by the
introduction of competition and deregulation into the
generating sector of the electric utility industry.
In January, 1998, DOE prepared an updated projection of the
volumes of spent fuel which would require isolation. This analy-
sis included a "sensitivity case" in which open reactors were as-
sumed to complete only thirty years of their forty-year licensed
operating lives. This change in assumptions resulted in a reduc-
tion in the total volumes of spent fuel to be discharged from ap-
proximately 87,000 MTU in the "reference case" to about 69,000
MTU in the "sensitivity case" - a decrease of twenty percent, as
indicated in Figure 2, infra.30 2 Perhaps more significant, this re-
duction of 18,000 MTU is all in post-1998 volumes of spent fuel to
be discharge, supplying a reduction of approximately thirty-six
percent in future nuclear generation and directly related NWF
revenues. But, the DOE's 1998 Fee Adequacy Assessment does
not include a parallel "sensitivity case."
This omission is clearly not warranted in light of experience
to date with nuclear plant longevity and the likely effects of elec-
tric utility industry restructuring. To date, no nuclear plant has
operated for its entire forty-year operating life. Of twenty-two
plants retired to date, only two operated for more than thirty
years. 30 3 Of the 106 plants still operating at the end of 1998, none
301. See OFFICE OF CWILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., DEP'T OF ENERGY, Nu-
CLEAR WASTE FUND FEE ADEQUACY: AN ASSESSMENT 12 (1998).
302. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
ANN. REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 1997 9 (1998).
303. BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199, at tbl. 2.1.
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had completed thirty years of operation.30 4 Moreover, the refer-
ence case in Biewald and White's study projects that restructuring
will result in shortening the operating lives of existing plants to
approximately thirty-five years, while their low generation case
forecasts that competition and deregulation will reduce the aver-
age operating life of open plants to roughly twenty-six years.
This projected shortening of the operating lives of existing re-
actors is important because it would not be associated with a pro-
portional reduction in OCRWM program costs. In particular,
Biewald and White project that the Nuclear Waste Fund would
prove inadequate in both their reference and their low generation
cases. 305 Clearly, then, a "conservative" approach to assessing the
adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund would require consideration
of the effects on future revenues of the introduction of competition
and deregulation into the generating sector of the electric utility
industry.
2. The General Accounting Office Should Be Charged with
Responsibility for Auditing the DOE's Assessment.
The DOE has chosen to assess the adequacy of the Nuclear
Waste Fund on the basis of a programmatic scenario that does not
consider the costs associated with interim storage before a reposi-
tory becomes available. The agency has also elected to ignore the
costs, which would result if waste needed to be removed from a
repository at any time following its initial emplacement. These
are clearly not appropriately "conservative" assumptions for pur-
poses of assessing Nuclear Waste Fund adequacy. Consultants
under contract to the State of Nevada, after a comprehensive re-
view, have concluded that the Department of Energy has substan-
tially underestimated the "total system, life-cycle" costs of the
commercial waste isolation program. Biewald and White have
found that OCRWM has significantly overestimated future Nu-
clear Waste Fund revenues in assessing the adequacy of the Nu-
clear Waste Fee. If the outside consultants are correct, DOE's
underestimate of costs and overestimate of revenues would have
"huge" implications for the future financing of the Nuclear Waste
Fund.
304. Compare id., with SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 24, at A.3
- 7, tbl. A-1.
305. BIEWALD & WHITE, supra note 199, at 16-19.
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In 1995, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was amended to pro-
vide that, at the request of either House of Congress (or any com-
mittee thereof), the General Accounting Office "shall conduct" an
audit of the OCRWM's waste isolation program and "shall submit
a report on the results."30 6 Clearly, Congress should exercise its
authority under this provision to charge the GAO with responsi-
bility for auditing OCRWM's most recent assessment of the ade-
quacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund, including its estimate of the
"total system, life-cycle costs" of the waste isolation program and
its projection of future revenues from the Nuclear Waste Fee.
This audit should be conducted using "conservative" assumptions.
This audit would provide an official and authoritative basis for de-
veloping future policy regarding the financing of the nation's com-
mercial spent fuel isolation program.
3. The Nuclear Waste Fund Should Be Perpetual, Not
Terminal.
DOE assumed in its 1998 assessment that the Nuclear Waste
Fee is adequate only if it generates sufficient revenues to cover the
costs of the Yucca Mountain repository through waste emplace-
ment, with $2.5 billion in constant 1997 dollars left over to cover
future costs. 30 7 Of this amount, $1.5 billion is the net present
value of the costs of permanently closing and decommissioning the
repository in 2016 and monitoring the open repository between
2042 and 2016.308 The remaining $1 billion is a "program contin-
gency" to cover costs in excess of the Department's estimate.30 9
Should a repository never become operational or, after becom-
ing operational, develop problems which required emplaced waste
to be retrieved before the repository is closed, costs will have to be
incurred indefinitely to isolate the spent fuel discharged from
commercial nuclear reactors. Neither of these contingencies can
be ruled out at present; one of them cannot be ruled out even in
the next century. As a result, prudence dictates that the Nuclear
Waste Fund should be redesigned to be perpetual, not terminal. 310
306. 42 U.S.C. § 10224(d) (Supp. 1997).
307. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., DEP'T OF ENERGY, Nu-
CLEAR WASTE FUND FEE ADEQUACY: AN ASSESSMENT 18 (1998).
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. Implicitly, DOE's financing scenario could accommodate this change in policy.
If a repository never becomes operational, or waste has to be retrieved before it is
closed, there would (at least in theory) be some amount of funds available to cover
those contingencies because some of the projected costs of operating, closing and
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In essence, the financing policy being recommended entails
that the principal amount of the Nuclear Waste Fund be stabilized
at a level such that the annual interest would be sufficient to pay
indefinitely the current best estimate of the annual future costs of
monitored, retrievable storage of all the spent fuel ultimately dis-
charged, whatever the location of the waste, whether Yucca Moun-
tain or elsewhere. While no one can guarantee the existence of
the Fund for the next 250,000 years, it should be funded on the
premise that the resources it represents should be available if
needed during that period.
4. The Financing Methods for the Nuclear Waste Fund Should
Be Modified to Reflect Both its Current Underfunded Status
and the Future Development of Competitive, Deregulated
Generation Markets.
Given the probability that the Department of Energy has sig-
nificantly underestimated the future costs of spent fuel isolation
and substantially overestimated the future revenues from nuclear
electricity, it is virtually certain that the Nuclear Waste Fund is
currently underfunded. Biewald and White have estimated that
this underfunding could be as much as $46.5 billion. Hopefully,
the GAO audit called for above will provide an official and there-
fore more authoritative estimate of the underfunding. But, as-
suming this underfunding is substantial, there is a critical need
to find the means to fund both the existing shortfall and the future
costs of isolating spent fuel, essentially in perpetuity.
a. The real policy issue is the source, not the method
of financing.
At the highest level of generality, the policy dilemma posed by
the financing of the costs of the interim storage and ultimate dis-
position of spent nuclear fuel is precisely the same as that posed
by investment "stranded" by nuclear plant cancellations and early
retirements. As noted legal scholar and policy commentator, Jo-
seph P. Tomain, has explained, "the primary problem is: Who
pays?"311
decommissioning the repository would be avoided. But, there would be no correlation
between this unexpended balance and the level of funding necessary to finance either
interim storage or retrieval and post-retrieval storage indefinitely.
311. TOMAIN, supra note 226, at 135.
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In a perfectly fair world, those responsible for incurring costs
without producing benefits should pay. In an imperfect world,
correlating responsible actors with irresponsible conduct is not
often easy, particularly when the state actively promotes the
capital expansion of a complex high-technology industry. Fre-
quently, an exact correspondence between conduct, cause and
consequence is lacking....
Likely candidates for imposing legal liability can be identified
by noting the actors in the nuclear drama. These include the
government and its officials, industry and its personnel, and
consumers and investors....
In connection with cost absorption or legal liability, government
is actually a euphemism for taxpayers. Only in the most out-
landish of situations, when a government official acts outside
the scope of his or her authority, usually with malice or other
equally gross conduct, will an individual be held financially lia-
ble. Therefore, the word taxpayers must be substituted for
government....
The fundamental fallacy in the arguments favoring imposition
of cost liability on government is that government as such does
not exist. The word government is a surrogate conception for
taxpayers. Similarly, industry as such does not exist. Rather,
industry is a collective concept including various public utilities
and private construction and manufacturing corporations. Just
as government passes its liability on to taxpayers, industry
passes its liability on to owners and investors-the firms' share-
holders and bondholders-or to consumers of the firms' goods
and services . .312
Ultimately, then, the only real candidates presently available to
nuclear waste policy-makers to pay the costs of spent fuel storage
and disposition are federal taxpayers, electricity consumers and
utility investors.
But, this necessarily short list of potential financiers need not
pay all the costs of isolating spent nuclear fuel and other high-
level radioactive wastes produced by nuclear power plants from
the environment now. Because these wastes are hazardous to
human health and the environment for approximately 250,000
years, their isolation is largely a matter of long-term future costs.
Those long-term costs could be deferred to the future 10,000 gen-
erations of humanity who will require protection from the radioac-
tive wastes produced by today's nuclear power plants while the
312. Id. at 135-38.
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current generation who produced those wastes pays only the pre-
sent and near-term future costs of their isolation. In effect, the
current generation of policy-makers has the option of deferring the
long-term costs of isolating high-level radioactive waste from the
environment. This option poses what is generally characterized in
the nuclear waste policy debate as the ethical problem of "tempo-
ral or inter-generational equity"-how much of the environmental
risk and economic cost associated with nuclear waste discharged
by the current generation may justifiably be shifted to future
generations?313
In essence, then, the primary policy issue is how much of the
cost of waste isolation should be paid by the current generation
and how much should be deferred to future generations. While
still very important, the allocation of the costs to be paid by the
current generation among federal taxpayers, electricity custom-
ers, and utility investors is clearly secondary over the longer term.
b. The right policy for the ages requires the current generation
of Americans to fund the existing Nuclear Waste Fund
shortfall and to adopt a means of funding the costs of
isolating spent fuel discharged in the future that is
sustainable indefinitely.
By definition, the existing shortfall in the Nuclear Waste
Fund results from past underfunding of future liabilities. In es-
sence, the Nuclear Waste Fee has heretofore been too low. To ad-
here to the NWPA principle that nuclear generators pay all waste
costs, and to assure equitable allocation of costs incurred among
waste generators, the method for calculating the one-time assess-
ment necessary to eliminate the existing shortfall and allocating it
among utilities and their customers should be retrospective. The
method which immediately comes to mind is the one-time fee per
kilogram of heavy metal which was imposed on spent nuclear fuel
generated prior to April 7, 1983, by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
when it was enacted in 1982.3 14 However, that NWPA provision
also expressly limited generator liability for the waste isolation
costs of spent fuel generated prior to April 7, 1983, to that one-
time assessment.315 As a result, the new one-time assessment be-
313. Compare SCHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 25, at 182-212, with Berkovitz,
supra note 35.
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(3).
315. See id.
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ing proposed here could be calculated and allocated based only on
spent fuel discharged on and after April 7, 1983.
While retrospective in its calculation and allocation, the pro-
posed one-time assessment would necessarily be prospective in
collection. Because the Nuclear Waste Fund shortfall developed
during the regime of rate-regulated monopolies, it would seem ap-
propriate to collect the one-time assessment the same way the Nu-
clear Waste Fee has been collected, i.e. through a non-bypassable
charge per kwh imposed on all (and not merely nuclear) electricity
sold during the collection period to the transmission and distribu-
tion customers of utilities which were nuclear generators during
the calculation period. It would also seem appropriate that the
charge should be collected over a relatively short period (e.g., not
to exceed ten years) to recognize the retrospective character of the
underlying shortfall that the one-time assessment is intended to
offset. While the specific mechanics of calculating and collecting
such a charge for affected utilities are beyond the scope of this
article, it would seem evident that the total assessment would
necessarily take into account spent fuel discharges from previ-
ously closed as well as currently operating plants. Additionally, it
would appear equitable to credit each affected utility (and its
transmission and distribution customers) with amounts hereto-
fore collected for spent fuel storage pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.54(bb). 316
316. While it is seldom noted or considered in discussions of the issues associated
with spent nuclear fuel, the NRC regulation found at 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(bb) is poten-
tially very significant to the financing issue. The wording of the regulation seems
relatively innocuous on its face, requiring commercial nuclear plant licensees to "sub-
mit written notification to the Commission for its review and preliminary approval of
the program by which the licensee intends to manage and provide funding for the
management of all irradiated fuel at the reactor following permanent cessation of op-
eration of the reactor until title to the irradiated fuel and possession of the fuel is
transferred to the Secretary of Energy for its ultimate disposal in a repository." See
10 C.F.R. 50.54(bb) (1998). But, licensees and their state regulatory commissions
have interpreted the regulation to require collection in a nuclear utility's annual
decommissioning charge not only the costs of plant decommissioning activities, but
the incremental amounts necessary to fund spent fuel management during and fol-
lowing such activities. See, e.g. Testimony of Bruce M. Barber on behalf of Indiana
Michigan Power Company, at 24, Cause No. 36760-SI (Ind. Util. Reg. Comm'n 1999).
The amounts collected pursuant to Section 50.54(bb) were neither separately identi-
fied nor significant in amount before 1990, since the disposition of any spent fuel re-
maining at the reactor site was assumed to occur in parallel with the major activities
of decommissioning. But, this assumption changed in 1990 to reflect the extension of
the at-reactor spent fuel storage period associated with projected delays in completion
of the Yucca Mountain repository and DOE's acceptance of spent fuel for shipment
and ultimate disposition. Id. at 23-25. The incremental amounts being collected and
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The financing of the costs of isolating spent nuclear fuel dis-
charged in the future presents a somewhat different problem than
financing the shortfall associated with wastes discharged in the
past. In particular, the future financing of the Nuclear Waste
Fund must take into account the introduction of competition and
deregulation into the generating sector of the electric utility in-
dustry. In this context, it is critical that the financing of the costs
of isolating spent fuel discharged in the future be internalized in
the market price of electricity generated and sold after deregula-
tion. This is true for two reasons.
First, cost internalization is important for environmental rea-
sons because it is the key to sustainable development. As Profes-
sor David Hodas has explained:
If there is any agreement on what sustainable development
means, it is that economic and environmental factors are com-
bined into a single decision, or in economic terms, that the ex-
ternalities of each activity must be internalized. Principle 16 of
the Rio Declaration confirms this vision: "[n]ational authorities
should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmen-
tal costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into ac-
count the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear
the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and
without distorting international trade and investment."
Whatever else sustainable development may mean, it must
mean that in every development decision the environmental
costs are internalized. 317
Second, cost internalization is important for classic economic
reasons. In a competitive, deregulated market, costs attributable
to a generator of electricity which do not have to be recovered in
the price it charges its customers represent a subsidy which pro-
vides a competitive advantage to that generator. As the Massa-
chusetts Department of Public Utilities has found:
reported as necessary to fund spent fuel management during and following decommis-
sioning have also become significant. For example, Northeast Utilities filed a 1999
report with the NRC which stated that $159 million of a total $691 million in esti-
mated decommissioning costs for the closed Millstone Unit 1 were associated with
post-closure spent fuel management. See Millstone Decommissioning to Cost $691
Million, MEGAWATT DAILY, June 24, 1999, available at 1999 WL 13892507.
317. David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA
Reconsidered, 3 WIDENER L. SyMP. J. 1, 2-3 (1998) (citing Rio Declaration on Environ-
mental Development, U.N. Conference on Env't and Development, Principle 16, at
879, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992)).
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In a competitive resource market in which price plays a predom-
inant role in determining business success of competing re-
source developers, there is a danger of increasing the pollution
of valuable environmental resources. This occurs because re-
source developers have the incentive to minimize environmental
controls in order to minimize production costs, which in turn en-
ables them to keep their price as low as possible (thus increas-
ing their chances of winning a competitive resource solicitation),
and affords them the opportunity to make private profits.3 18
The key to cost internalization is to identify and quantify the
incremental future costs of waste isolation which are attributable
to the future discharges of spent fuel and to differentiate them
from future costs attributable to past discharges of spent fuel.
This task is well beyond the scope of this article; it is unques-
tionably a task requiring technical expertise which will have to be
performed by engineers and economists under the watchful eyes of
interested parties and regulators. But, certain observations do
seem in order here. First and foremost, incremental discharges of
spent fuel do have incremental isolation costs, from extra storage
casks, additional fuel assembly handling, and enlarged storage ar-
eas at-reactor, to additional shipments and transportation cask
handling during waste acceptance and transportation, to incre-
mental waste packet handling, emplacement, and, potentially, re-
trieval at a repository. Second, the costs associated with
incremental discharges will be significant. Depending upon the
impacts of electric industry restructuring on future nuclear en-
ergy generated and sold, it appears quite likely that 30,000 to
50,000 MTU of spent fuel will be discharged after January 1,
2000. Comparatively, this means that between forty to sixty per-
cent of the total volume of spent fuel projected to be discharged by
commercial nuclear plants will be discharged after January 1,
2000.
The implications of incremental cost internalization for the
level of the Nuclear Waste Fee is unclear at this point. Biewald
and White's study does not posit a one-time assessment to fund
the existing shortfall in the Nuclear Waste Fund with respect to
waste isolation costs attributable to spent fuel discharged in the
past. Their study also does not attempt to differentiate costs at-
318. Re Pricing and Rate-making Treatment for New Electric Generating Facilities
Which Are Not Qualifying Facilities, Decision No. 86-36-G, at 79 (Mass. Dept. Pub.
Utils. 1989), quoted in Rudy Perkins, Electricity Deregulation, Envtl. Externalities
and the Limitations of Price, 39 B. C. L. REV. 903, 1033 (1998).
454 [Vol. 18
72http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss2/8
FINANCING FOR ETERNITY
tributable to spent fuel discharged in the past from those attribu-
table to spent fuel to be discharged in the future. As a result,
their conclusion that the Nuclear Waste Fee will have to be in-
creased promptly and significantly to compensate for DOE's un-
derestimate of future waste isolation program costs and its
overestimate of future Nuclear Waste Fund revenues does not
necessarily hold given the recommendations made here. In view
of the apparent size of the current shortfall attributable to a pe-
riod when the fee was also one mill, it appears doubtful that the
current one mill fee would prove adequate to internalize in the
price of nuclear electricity the incremental costs of spent fuel to be
discharged in the future, even assuming the shortfall associated
with costs attributable to past discharges is funded by the one-
time assessment proposed in this article. But, any definitive con-
clusion regarding the required level of the Nuclear Waste Fee in
the future will have to await the outcome of the General Account-
ing Office audit of fee adequacy proposed here.
VIII. Conclusion
A. Restatement of Thesis
This article has evaluated the adequacy of current law and
policy for financing the Nuclear Waste Fund created by the Nu-
clear Waste Policy Act of 1982 in light of the structural disaggre-
gation of the electric utility industry and the introduction of
competition and deregulation into its generating sector which are
now underway in the United States. This evaluation has been
conducted in the context of a concise history of the development of
national policy regarding the isolation from the environment of
the commercial, high-level nuclear waste commonly known as
"spent nuclear fuel." This evaluation has concluded that signifi-
cant changes in current law and policy would be required and ex-
pected even in the absence of electric industry restructuring.
However, this article has also concluded that electric industry re-
structuring may be expected to precipitate a crisis for current law
and policy, the resolution of which will require significant changes
in the structure and financing of the Nuclear Waste Fund. This
crisis will almost certainly face the new President because it is
highly unlikely to be resolved in the waning days of the Clinton
administration.
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B. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations
National policy for financing the costs of isolating from the
environment the spent nuclear fuel discharged from commercial
nuclear power plants has heretofore been premised on a tradi-
tional paradigm involving "cost of service" regulation of vertically-
integrated electric utilities with exclusive, franchised service ter-
ritories. However, the restructuring of the electric utility indus-
try now underway entails the structural disaggregation of
generation, transmission, distribution and marketing and the in-
troduction of competition and deregulation for electricity genera-
tion and marketing. Deregulation of and competition among
generators of electricity will result in the early retirement of a sig-
nificant number of uneconomic commercial nuclear plants. In
turn, the early retirement of a significant number of nuclear
plants, coupled with the escalating costs for the proposed Yucca
Mountain repository, will create a financing crisis for commercial
nuclear waste policy.
Specifically, the Nuclear Waste Fund is almost certainly un-
derfunded substantially at the present time. Moreover, its future
funding will undoubtedly be affected adversely by the introduction
of competition and deregulation into the generating sector of the
electric utility industry. Consequently, the structure and financ-
ing of the Nuclear Waste Fund requires a major overhaul. In
particular:
(a) Several critical components of the waste isolation program
concept used by the Department of Energy to assess the adequacy
of the Nuclear Waste Fund should be redefined to reflect more
"conservative" assumptions.
(b) The General Accounting Office should be charged with re-
sponsibility for auditing the Department of Energy's assessment
of the adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund.
(c) The Nuclear Waste Fund should be perpetual, not
terminal.
(d) The financing method for the Nuclear Waste Fund should
be modified to respond to both its current underfunded status and
the future development of a competitive, deregulated generation
market.
"There never has been a no-regulation or free-market ap-
proach to nuclear power,"319 nor will there be as a result of the
319. TOMAIN, supra note 226, at 30 n.1.
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restructuring of the electric utility industry now underway. The
need to monitor and maintain facilities for the safe isolation of
spent fuel and other high-level nuclear waste for up to 250,000
years will require a continuing regulatory role for government. A
critical component of that ongoing role will be financing a restruc-
tured Nuclear Waste Fund in perpetuity. Financing is one part of
the nuclear waste problem which the current generation of Ameri-
cans can solve. Indeed, financing may well be the only part of the
spent fuel problem which the current generation need not defer to
future generations for a solution. Moreover, the ability of the cur-
rent generation of Americans to solve the financing part of the
problem could prove essential to future generations of Americans
having the resources necessary to continue to address the crux of
the nuclear waste problem - isolating spent nuclear fuel from the
environment, essentially forever. To rephrase Kai Erickson:
We cannot promise our own children-never mind those who fol-
low hundreds of thousands of years hence-that they will be safe
from the wastes. And so long as that is so, let us leave them as a
legacy not only the wastes, but also the resources they will need
to make themselves safe from the wastes.320
320. ERICKSON, supra note 278.
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